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Preface
Top management echelons in every sector of the business world 
concern themselves with almost every activity in the organizations for 
which they are responsible. The major and strategic marketing deci­
sions, for example, are often felt to be too important to be left entirely 
to the marketing manager. Similarly, strategic changes in product 
lines, personnel policy, finance and new construction are reviewed at 
the board or executive committee level. Senior executives do realize, 
however, that they cannot immerse themselves in minute operating 
detail and that they must delegate the day-to-day operating decisions. 
But the determination of the company’s basic policies and response to 
its environment is rightly the province of those who, as trustees for 
the company’s shareholders, are responsible for its continued profit­
ability.
One area in which management sometimes provides less long-term 
guidance and direction than is desirable is inventory control. Profes­
sional managers must be aware of the importance of inventory control, 
if only in its cash flow or fund use aspects. Too often, however, man­
agement seems to concern itself with what has already happened, i.e., 
asking why inventory levels have increased rather than providing 
guidelines by which inventory policies may be determined. Manage­
ment’s policy may then be characterized as reaction rather than plan­
ning. From such a position, it is impossible for management to lay 
down the decision rules on the basis of which inventory policy is to 
operate.
Inventory polices do have considerable strategic significance. The 
financing of increased stocks of parts or materials is a major use of 
funds and a basic factor in working capital management. Fund 
needs for inventory purposes competes with other uses of funds, and 
may be the deciding factor in decisions concerning long-term fund 
raising or the approval of new capital budget projects. A decision to
vii
adopt a “flat” rate of production where demand is seasonal and to 
absorb the difference between production and sales by means of in­
creased inventory will have great significance for the company’s per­
sonnel and recruitment policies and for its public relations with the 
local community. All these are matters of concern to the company’s 
top planning and policy making group.
This is an area in which the CPA’s advice may be invaluable. He 
can assist his corporate clients in two ways: by helping management 
to identify the costs on which inventory policy must be based (to be 
discussed further in this study), and, perhaps more important, by 
bringing a fresh, “outside” approach to problems in this area and 
identifying situations in which change is required but which have be­
come accepted as part of the corporate environment. The most diffi­
cult problem may be the establishment of criteria upon which inven­
tory policy should be judged. The CPA who has a sound basic under­
standing of the issues involved may render his clients valuable assist­
ance in this area.
The purpose of this publication then is to highlight those issues and 
to show, through the case studies which follow, how the CPA can 
indeed help his clients.
This technical study has been prepared by Robert A. Farmer and 
Associates, Inc., and Henry De Vos, CPA.
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*Practical Techniques and Policies 
for Inventory Control
THE NATURE OF INVENTORY
The basic justification for having inventories is to introduce a degree 
of flexibility into the manufacturing and merchandising operations. 
If it were not for inventories, each operation would then be perfectly 
synchronized with every other event: assembly parts, for instance, 
would be received at the plant at the very instant that they are 
required for assembly into the final product and that final product 
itself would be completed on the very day that it is to be shipped to 
the ultimate consumer. Clearly this is unworkable.
Inventories arise from a variety of circumstances and serve many 
specific functions. They provide the flexibility required for rational 
operational policies.
Transit Inventory
Wherever materials, work-in-process or finished goods have to be 
moved between locations, those materials or goods are not immediately 
available for further processing or sale. In effect, they are in temporary 
storage. The volume of the inventory resulting from this fact is a 
function of both the level of usage (or sales) and transit time. The 
tim e taken to move work-in-process items betw een operations in the 
machine shop is very short, perhaps a few minutes at the most. The 
transit inventory in this instance will probably be small, even at high 
levels of production. (In-process items may be seen around the ma­
chine shop in bins or on pallets for much longer periods but will, in
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such cases, serve quite a different purpose from that of transit in­
ventory.) On the other hand, transportation of finished goods from 
the factory warehouse to distributor’s depots will probably be con­
siderably longer. If that is in fact the case, the transit inventory will 
be relatively large.
The creation of transit inventories is best demonstrated by a simple 
mathematical example. Assume that a distributor sells 150 units of a 
product per day, and that the transportation of this product from the 
factory to the distributor requires four days. Clearly it is not prac­
ticable for the distributor to wait until he has run out of stock before 
ordering further supplies of the product. His policy should be to so 
place his orders that some quantity of the product is always on its way 
to him so that during fairly stable conditions and level demand the 
amount in transit will be equal to the amount expected to be sold in 
four days. Thus, if an average of recorded sales in recent periods 
amounts to 150 units per day, the transit inventory should be:
4 X 150 =  600 units
The distributor’s daily stock record would appear as shown in Exhibit 
1, below.
Two points of interest should be noted:
1. The distributor can not allow his inventory to reach zero. Orders 
must be so timed that new supplies will be received one day before 
the stock is depleted. This allows for a buffer or safety stock of 150 
units. This will be discussed further in a later section.
Exhibit 1
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2. The distributor’s average inventory level should be equal to his 
safety stock plus half the order size:
150 +  600/2 =  450 units
Up to this point it is assumed that the distributor believes that the 
demand for his product in the immediate future will be the same as in 
the previous period. The en route transit inventory therefore was the 
amount necessary to replenish inventory at a constant level. If how­
ever, there is reason to believe that the demand next period will be 
greater than the last period, orders equal to the transit time multiplied 
by the anticipated future demand rate with an additional quantity to 
increase the size of buffer stock must be placed. Transit inventories 
during periods where increased demand is experienced or expected, 
therefore, will be greater than those during periods of level demand.
In-Process Inventory
In most manufacturing industries, in-process inventory is relatively 
small, even where operations are on a large scale. A major automobile 
assembly plant which assembles perhaps 2,000 vehicles each day, for 
example, will have a limited in-process inventory because the timing 
and scheduling of deliveries and operations is tightly controlled. Each 
vehicle that leaves the final inspection line will have been constructed 
of components delivered to the plant only a few hours earlier, and 
the entire process is completed in less than a day.
A very different situation exists, however, in industries in which 
there is an element of “maturing” in the process. An extreme example 
is that of the wine industry, in which the volume of liquid undergoing 
fermentation or aging becomes the largest element out of the total 
investment in inventories. In such industries, financing in-process in­
ventory often becomes the major use of funds provided by operations.
Organizational Inventory
Most production processes involve two or more distinct operations. 
If the in-plant inventory consisted only of units actually being manu­
factured at a certain moment (in-process inventory) and units being 
moved between operations ( transit inventory), then it would be neces­
sary to synchronize each operation exactly with the preceding and 
following operations. Where a single product is manufactured, this
3
could be difficult. Where two or more products are made utilizing 
the same equipment, it could become quite impossible.
Suppose, for example, that a single product is being manufactured, 
and that the production of the product involves two distinct opera­
tions, “shaping” and “finishing.” Each unit of product requires seven 
minutes “shaping” time and five minutes “finishing” time. It can 
immediately be seen that with only one shaping machine and one 
finishing machine it would be impossible to synchronize the two 
machines exactly. The finishing machine would be idle for two- 
sevenths of the working day. One solution would be to have seven 
shaping machines and five finishing machines thus:
Shaping
(Seven Machines)
Finishing 
(Five Machines)
Capacity:
1 unit every minute 1 unit every minute
Every five minutes the shaping group would produce five-sevenths of 
seven units (five units), equal to the capacity of the finishing group. 
It would then be a simple matter to synchronize the two. Such a solu­
tion, obviously, is only practicable if the scale of production is suffi­
ciently large to warrant the purchase of that many machines. Sup­
pose, however, that a new product is added, and that each new unit 
requires four minutes shaping time and two minutes finishing time, 
using the same machines. The position is now:
Shaping
(Seven Machines)
Original product capacity:
1 unit per minute
New product capacity:
1¾ units per minute
Finishing 
(Five Machines)
1 unit per minute
2½  units per minute
Under these conditions it will be impossible to synchronize the oper­
ations when the new product is being produced unless some of the 
finishing machines are shut down for part of the day.
The easiest way to avoid this problem is to allow an inventory of 
shaped but unfinished parts to accumulate between the two processes. 
4
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At some point in the shift, this inventory will reach a peak. When that 
occurs, the shaping machines should be switched to another operation 
while the finishing machines continue operations until the temporary 
stockpile has been eliminated. Then the cycle will start over again. 
This temporary stockpile has simplified management’s task by intro­
ducing a degree of independence between the two stages and reducing 
the coordination requirement. For this reason such inventory is called 
“organizational” inventory. It is often referred to as “decoupling” 
inventory.
Seasonal Inventory
In most instances the demand for a product is not evenly distributed 
over the year: frequently there are one or two seasonal peaks of 
demand with relatively slack seasons in between. Examples that are 
often used are manufacturers of Christmas decorations, sporting goods, 
outdoor leisure equipment, and certain gift items. A company pro­
ducing these items could decide to match their output as closely as 
possible with the demand cycle; this would result in high levels of 
production during four or five months of the year in anticipation of 
the seasonal peak demand and a much lower level thereafter. Under 
such a policy there would be virtually no seasonal inventory. The 
acceptance of such a policy, however, would entail the hiring and 
training of new employees before every peak sales period, only to dis­
miss them in slack periods. The costs associated with such fluctuations 
may be very high. In that case, an alternative policy of maintaining a 
level rate of production throughout the year is often adopted. This 
allows for the accumulation of inventory during periods of slack de­
mand and the reduction of inventory when demand reaches its peak.
The Sheldon Surfboard Company demonstrates this effect. Demand 
for the company’s product, surfboards, is highly seasonal with a 
marked sales peak in June and July. The past five years has conformed 
approximately to the pattern shown in Exhibit 2, page 6.
Average monthly sales over the year are approximately 150 units, 
but the entire year’s demand is concentrated within a seven-month 
period, March through September. If the company attempted to match 
production to the pattern of demand, it would be forced to close down 
completely during part of each year. However, Sheldon Surfboard sets 
its production at a level approximating the monthly mean demand of 
150 units. Assuming that they begin their operating cycle in October 
and that sales during the peak season consumed all but the 20 units
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that remain in the factory warehouse at the end of September, Sheldon 
Surfboard would then produce in anticipation for next year’s sales 
substantially as shown in Exhibit 3, page 7. That figure shows the 
relationship of production level, sales and finished-goods inventory in 
the factory warehouse. It can be observed that the finished-goods 
inventory has a marked seasonal peak immediately before the period 
of peak demand. This in turn is drawn down almost to zero by the 
end of the peak demand period in August and then commences to 
build up again in anticipation of the next seasonal demand period. In 
this way, production level is constant and the costs of seasonal hiring 
and firing are avoided. These benefits are, however, reduced by the 
cost of carrying or storing a seasonal inventory.
Batch Inventory
Under exceptional circumstances, the parts used in the fabrication 
of a product may be ordered or produced one at a time; this could be 
true for example in the construction of a major engineering project 
such as a special purpose furnace, a conveyor system for bulk-minerals 
handling, and so forth. But in normal circumstances and in most in­
dustries, all parts and materials used are bought or made in batches. 
The batch size may be determined by the practice of the trade, the 
minimum order size for which quantity discounts are given, or trans­
port considerations; for many materials a carload is the minimum prac­
ticable quantity. The effect of these batch quantities is to produce a 
temporary stockpile of parts from which production requirements are 
drawn.
One of the basic materials used by the Sheldon Surfboard Company 
is glass fibre matting used as a reinforcing medium in the moulded
Exhibit 2
500
400
Sates
Per 300
month
200
100
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Exhibit 3
fiberglass surfboards. The producers of this material refuse to supply 
less than a carload lot at any one time. At a level of production rate 
of 150 boards per month, this represents a five-week supply of glass 
fibre matting. The inventory of this material over time will be as 
shown in Exhibit 4, page 8.
Once again it will be observed that the supply is never allowed to 
completely diminish. A reverse or “buffer” of one-week’s supply is 
left on hand at all times. The average level of stock of this material 
will be :
Batch size 
Buffer +-----------------
2
=  1 +  5/2 =  3½  weeks’ supply.
7
Buffer or Safety Stocks
Safety stock has already been encountered in this study. The dis­
tributor in the transit inventory example maintained a reserve of fin­
ished units in excess of expected demand. The surfboard manufac­
turer kept a reserve amounting to one week’s supply of materials on 
hand. In these and all other cases, buffer stocks are a defense against 
the unpredictable. For example, sales demand may differ from what 
had been expected; delivery of the next batch of new material may be 
delayed by a strike at the supplier’s plant or by the railroad. A typical 
protection against such contingencies is to keep a reserve on hand 
“just in case.” This form of inventory, then, takes into consideration 
the element of uncertainty in most industrial activity.
An important point must be emphasized. The investment in buffer 
stocks really amounts to purchasing safety, but safety is relative. The 
decision to be faced is how much should be bought. The distributor 
in an earlier example expected retail demand to be 150 units of product 
per day, but by maintaining a buffer he acknowledged that he was 
not certain. It will be remembered that the distributor could not re­
ceive an additional supply in less than four days after placing his 
order. By maintaining a safety stock of 150 units, the distributor was 
in effect saying, “I expect demand to be 150 units a day, but I recog­
nize that it could be as high as 150 +  150/4 or 187.5 units, per day.”
The distributor might have clarified his thoughts concerning this 
matter by assessing the probabilities for the various possible levels of
Material 
on hand, 
in weeks 
requirements
Exhibit 4
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demand, thus: “I guess there is about one chance in twenty that de­
mand will be as high as 188 units a day.” If the distributor was asked 
what chance there was of demand equaling 200 units a day he might 
reply from experience, “Oh, around 1 in 100.” In other words, he 
chose to invest in a safety stock which gave him protection against 
being out of stock at the 95 per cent level of confidence. Had the dis­
tributor chosen to cover the 1 in 100 situation, he would then gain the 
protection of a level of confidence equaling 99 per cent.
This “trade-off” of degree of protection against the cost of obtaining 
that protection is one of the basic policy decisions which management 
must make in the field of inventory control. However, many of these 
decisions are made unconsciously, or there is a failure to review such 
decisions once made. The decision must be made deliberately and 
reviewed in the light of experience. The CPA who does no more than 
make his client aware that such trade-off decisions exist will have 
rendered a valuable service.
DEVELOPING DECISION RULES
Relevant Costs in Inventory Control
The costs which bear directly upon the question of how much in­
ventory to carry—and that must be considered in any answer to that 
question—fall into three categories: the costs of ordering or producing 
inventory, the costs of carrying inventory and the costs of being out 
of stock. The development of relevant cost figures is one of the most 
difficult aspects of inventory control. The costs required are not those 
normally found in financial statements, and will not be immediately 
available in organizations that have not previously employed formal 
inventory controls. The company setting up control procedures for 
the first time, or revising a long-obsolete system, is likely to rely 
heavily upon the advice of its accounting advisors, and it is essential 
that the CPA have a sound concept of what these relevant costs are.
The relevant costs are essentially incremental costs. They are not 
concerned with sunk costs, nor with those costs that remain to be 
liquidated in the fu ture regardless of w hether a particular inventory 
policy is adopted or not. A decision concerning whether a particular 
inventory policy should be employed will be based upon the additional 
costs of that policy, any costs which may be avoided by adopting that 
policy, and the loss faced if the policy fails to provide all inventory 
items when they are needed. The costs incremental to any one plan
9
should be considered not in the abstract but in relation to the costs 
of alternative inventory policies. The inventory policy chosen should 
be that policy which, on the basis of cost data, minimizes total rele­
vant costs.
Costs of Ordering a Set-up: Batch Costs
Two distinct elements may be identified in the cost of all items 
obtained for use in the company’s operations. These elements are 
present whether a client chooses to buy the material from an outside 
vendor or whether he produces the material himself. On the one hand 
there are the costs which are usually referred to as “variable costs” 
but which are fixed in terms of units procured such as the material 
and direct labor content of items manufactured and the list price of 
the items purchased. The remaining costs are those which do not have 
a constant “per unit” relationship but are dependent upon the number 
of orders placed or on batches of units produced. It is the latter costs 
which must be considered in determining inventory policy.
These costs are normally referred to as “ordering” costs where items 
are externally procurred and as “set-up” costs where items are pro­
duced within the company. Both terms are oversimplifications. The 
costs in each case are basically similar but have a number of distinct
Internally Manufactured 
Items
Cost of originating work 
order
Set-up cost 
Jigs and dies
Material handling in plant 
'Learning’ cost
elements as outlined below:
Externally Procured 
Items
Cost of originating 
purchase order
Clerical cost of receiving 
the material in the 
warehouse
Material handling in 
warehouse
Shipping costs 
Purchase discounts
The cost of the clerical work involved in the preparation of a pur­
chase order is clearly an important factor in the total cost of placing 
an order. It is also an example of a cost figure which may not be 
readily available unless the company has instituted a clerical work
10
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study program. Some companies arrive at such a figure by dividing 
the total operating expenses of the purchasing department, including 
the salary of the manager, by the total number of orders placed. The 
average order cost thus obtained, however, is not an incremental cost. 
The cost required is the out-of-pocket cost of placing one additional 
order, and even a very approximate estimate of it is likely to be less 
misleading than an average cost which includes overhead expenses.
The cost of placing the order is not the only relevant cost. Other 
costs which will be incurred in connection with every order and will 
be largely independent of the size of the order include the clerical 
content of the receiving department’s cost and, within broad limits, 
the cost of physically handling the material received. Transportation 
costs may be included in this category where, for example, it is neces­
sary to send a vehicle to pick up the material whether the quantity 
involved is 500 or 5,000 units. Finally, it will be necessary to take into 
account quantity discounts which are not based on a constant “per 
order” cost element but rather act as an encouragement to reduce the 
number of orders placed. Quantity discounts are often an important 
influence in determining inventory levels.
The most obvious element in the “per-batch” cost of items produced 
within the company is the “set-up” cost: the labor involved in chang­
ing machine settings, tool bits, dies and fixtures when changing from 
a production run on one product to that on another. Here also, other 
costs are relevant: the clerical cost of making out a work order card, 
the cost of any extra jigs and fixtures required and the cost of material 
handling services required between operations which again, within 
broad limits, are independent of the batch size. Where the item under 
consideration is not produced by the company, an important element 
will be the “learning cost”; the cost of extra labor and spoilage which 
will be incurred until operators have become familiar with the process.
Inventory Carrying Costs
Certain costs are incurred when inventory is carried in stock. Two 
elements are of particular importance: the costs arising through “spoil­
age” of stocks which are held for any length of time and the oppor­
tunity cost or interest cost of the funds tied up. To these costs must 
be added a charge for the space occupied by the inventory, whether 
rented or owned, and the cost of insurance and taxes on that portion 
of the property.
“Spoilage” costs include physical deterioration of perishable stocks
11
and losses through pilfering. A more important consideration in many 
cases, however, is the danger of obsolescence. Such a cost is particu­
larly difficult to assess, but in circumstances where it is a conceivable 
threat, obsolescence is likely to be costly. The disposal of obsolete 
inventory items is often at prices well below cost, or, in extreme cases, 
it involves outright scrapping. Inventory decision rule policies which 
do not take into account the dangers of obsolescence, and its possible 
cost penalties, are far from optimal.
The derivation of the capital cost element in the cost of carrying 
inventory is controversial. Some companies use the rate of interest at 
which they can borrow funds as an inventory cost. Others use the 
“opportunity” cost or the interest which the funds tied up in inventory 
could earn if applied elsewhere in the company. The two methods 
give widely differing answers: the borrowing rate is unlikely to be 
more than 8 per cent whereas the opportunity rate may well be more 
than 20 per cent. One solution would be to use the borrowing rate 
when funds are plentiful and the opportunity-cost rate when funds 
are scarce and must be allocated among competing needs. Beranek,1 
in a recent book, offers a solution which seems more acceptable. He 
suggests the use of the borrowing rate when specific borrowing has 
been undertaken for the express purpose of financing inventory, with 
a repayment schedule such that the average amount outstanding is 
equal to average inventory; he recommends the opportunity cost rate 
in those cases where this requirement is not met. If, for simplicity, 
the CPA wishes to recommend to his client a single rate to be used in 
all circumstances, then that rate should be the opportunity cost rate.
The Cost of Being Out of Stock
Here, again, there is a need to develop a cost figure not normally 
produced by the existing accounting system. In order to do so, a 
considerable degree of judgment will have to be used. Stockouts may 
be experienced in raw materials and semi-finished inventories as well 
as in finished goods. In the former cases the relevant costs will in­
clude renumeration of operators temporarily idled by material short­
ages and the incremental expenses arising from any rescheduling of 
production required. If the stockout is in finished-goods inventory, 
the first consideration to be faced is whether or not orders are likely 
to be lost to competition. If this is the case, the relevant cost will be
1 Beranek, Working Capital Management, Wadsworth, 1966.
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the contribution to profit foregone on the items not sold. It may be 
argued that the real cost is considerably higher than this in that the 
company’s relations with its customers may be damaged and future 
orders lost. If, however, management believes that the unfilled orders 
can be added to an order backlog and filled at a later date, the relevant 
costs will be those of the extra clerical work, telephone calls, expedit­
ing and, possibly, additional transportation expense.
How Much to Order or Produce
When the relative costs have been determined, they must then be 
plotted to determine how total costs will vary under different in­
ventory ordering policies. A formula can be introduced by which 
optimum order or production batch quantities may be determined.
The Rawcliffe Company produces automobile accessories of various 
kinds. A number of these accessories employ 3/16" machine screws, 
and the company’s usage experience is 2,500 units per week or 125,000 
per year. The cost of the screws, purchased in quantities of at least 
5,000 is $4 per 1,000. The cost of placing an order for the screws is 
$5, irrespective of the quantity ordered. The risk of obsolescence is 
negligible, and the cost of storage has been estimated at $1 per 1,000 
per year. The company’s rate of return on capital employed is 10 
per cent per year. In the first instance it is assumed that stockouts are 
not considered possible as demand can be forecasted with certainty. 
The total costs of alternative inventory policies can then be calculated 
as shown in Exhibit 5, page 14.
Clearly the first policy, ordering twice a year, involves lower total 
costs than ordering a small quantity every two working weeks. The 
optimum may or may not be somewhere between the two. Since it 
would be highly inconvenient to have to perform such a calculation 
for every possible ordering policy, the following formula is used to 
indicate the optimum order quantity.2
QO = 2COR
I
where QO =  Optim um  order quantity  
CO =  Cost of placing an order
R =  Annual usage
I =  Inventory carrying cost per unit per year
2 The formula assumes a relatively constant usage throughout the year.
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This formula can be applied to the Rawcliffe Company’s problem as 
follows:
QO =
2 X 5 X 125,000
.0014
=  29,880 units.
In other words, the company’s optimum order policy is to place an 
order for a batch of 30,000 units when new supplies are required— 
approximately every 12 weeks if usage is spread evenly over the year. 
If total costs under this policy are calculated by the procedure used 
in the table above, they will amount to $36 per year.
The method used to calculate the optimum batch size (length of 
production run) where the items are produced by the company rather 
than purchased is essentially the same but requires a modification of 
the formula to reflect the difference in average inventory. When com­
ponents are purchased from outside vendors, the components are 
normally delivered in a single batch (equal to the order quantity, QO) 
and this stock is then gradually depleted until another batch is re­
ceived. Average inventory therefore amounts to one-half of the quan­
tity ordered. When the component is produced, the plant stock de­
pends upon both the rate at which the components are being pro-
Policy:
Exhibit 5
Order Twice 
a Year
Order Every 
Second Week
Annual usage ................................ ...... 125,000 125,000
No. of orders* .............................. 2 25
Order batch size ............................ ...... 62,500 5,000
Average inventory Q /2 ................
Carrying costs:
...... 31,250 2,500
Storage cost ................................ ...... $31.25 $2.50
Capital cost ................................ 12.50 1.00
$43.75 $3.50
Cost of placing orders .................. 10.00 125.00
Total cost: ..................................... ...... $53.75 $128.50
* For the purpose of this table, a 50-week year is assumed, 
will be maintained in the study.
This assumption
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R
duced and the rate at which they are used in the final product. Aver­
age inventory in these circumstances will be:
Q /2 X (1  -
where R is the annual usage rate as before and P is the annual produc­
tion rate if the item were in continuous production. The optimum 
batch size formula then becomes:3
Qp =  .
2C R
I
R
P
Qp =
2 X 5 X 125,000
.0014 1 -
125,000 
375,000 
=  36,660
C in this formula is the cost of setting up the machinery to produce 
a particular component.
Assume, for example, the Rawcliffe Company has sufficient screw­
cutting machine capacity to permit it to produce its requirements of 
the 3/16" machine screws instead of buying them from outside sup­
pliers, that the set-up cost is $5 and the rate at which the screws can 
be produced is 375,000 per year. Using the above formula it is noted 
that, by shifting from a policy of purchasing to one of internal pro­
duction of the screws, the optimum batch size increases from 30,000 
to 37,000. This is not surprising because requirements are now pro­
duced over a period of time rather than being received in a few large 
consignments. This results in a lower average inventory which in turn 
lowers the carrying cost. Further, the break-even point between the 
cost of ordering versus the set-up and carrying cost has moved to a 
higher figure.
It is now possible to calculate the optimum batch sizes for purchased 
and internally produced parts. In many cases, a further saving in cleri­
cal effort is possible. It will be observed that some of the cost figures
3 See footnote 2, page 13.
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used are likely to be common to every calculation, particularly the 
capital cost element in inventory carrying costs and the cost of placing 
an order. If a slight oversimplification is accepted and the carrying 
cost is treated as a percentage of the purchase price, a table of econo­
mic order quantities can be constructed using the formula on page 13. 
The batch size for subsequent items may then be read directly from 
the table without further calculation. A further possibility is to con­
struct a nomograph from which the batch sizes may be read. Discus­
sion of the techniques used to construct such tables and nomographs 
can be found in a number of standard texts on production and inven­
tory control. Reference should be made to the bibliography at the 
end of this study.
When to Order
The question of when additional material or components should be 
ordered, unfortunately, cannot be answered simply by “when neces­
sary.” Two complicating factors exist. First, when many hundreds or 
thousands of items are in inventory, no single person can be expected 
to remain aware of the stock levels of all items. Therefore, some kind 
of system which will signal to management the fact that stocks of a 
particular item are dangerously low must be devised. If perpetual 
balances are not monitored daily, “review cycle” lead time will be re­
quired. In addition, few items or materials are available immediately; 
time must be allowed for processing an order, for transportation from 
manufacturer to user, and perhaps for the fabrication of custom items. 
There will be a time-lag, which is called “lead time,” between ordering 
and receiving that item. The order must therefore be placed some 
time before a stockout. An adequate reserve must be left on hand to 
meet sales demands during the lead time. A further complicating 
factor is that demand during the lead time will rarely be known with 
certainty and will usually take the form of a probability distribution. 
Three of the essential factors in the determination of inventory policy, 
therefore, will be management’s estimate of lead time, of the usage or 
demand likely to be experienced during this lead time, and the deci­
sion as to the degree of protection required against stockouts—i.e., 
whether a limited possibility of a stockout is acceptable or whether the 
company will try to achieve 100 per cent coverage of any possible de­
mand.
The most frequently used inventory control mechanism is that 
known as the “fixed order quantity system.” Under this system a pre­
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determined quantity of stock, usually calculated on the basis of the 
formulae introduced in the preceding section, is ordered whenever 
inventory on hand falls to a particular level. The stock level at which 
the “reorder” signal is generated is the “buffer stock.”
If demand during the lead-time period could be forecast with com­
plete accuracy, it would be a simple task to calculate the necessary 
buffer-stock level. Assume for example that the usage of the 3/16" 
screws in the examples given earlier is completely predictable at 2,500 
per week and that the screws were purchased from an outside vendor. 
The time lag between ordering more screws and receiving them into 
store was determined to be two weeks. The buffer stock would amount 
to 5,000 units as follows:
Buffer stock =  Lead time in periods X usage per period 
=  2 X 2,500 
=  5,000
Therefore, a new order for 30,000 units should be placed whenever 
the inventory stock of screws falls to 5,000. The inventory of this item 
will then follow the pattern shown in Exhibit 6, below, with new 
orders being placed at point R in weeks 8 and 20.
Where usage during the lead time is not known with certainty, 
calculation of a buffer stock level is considerably more difficult. Sup­
pose that Rawcliffe Company’s schedule for the products in which 
these screws are used is tied closely to new-car sales month by month 
and is, therefore, highly variable and difficult to forecast. Manage­
ment might state its position thus: “We expect to use around 2,500 of
Exhibit 6
level
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these screws per week. There is a one in ten chance, though, that 
usage may be 3,500 and a one in 20 chance that it may be as high 
as 4,500.”
The essential point to be made here is that the buffer stock will be 
decided by a trade-off between protection and cost. If the possibility 
of a stockout is completely unacceptable, then management will wish 
to decide upon a rate of usage which in their opinion cannot possibly 
be exceeded and will use that rate as the basis for a buffer stock. 
Such a policy will give complete protection, but at a high cost in in­
ventory carrying charges. More usually, management will decide that 
some chance of running out of stock is acceptable. If the acceptable 
chance is one in 20, then the buffer stock will be lead time in periods 
multiplied by the estimated usage per period (2 X 4,500 or 9,000).
In statistical terms it could be said that a buffer stock of 9,000 will 
provide protection at the 95 per cent confidence level, which means 
simply that the odds are 19 in 20 in favor of having enough stock to 
carry the company safely through the order lead time. A similar cal­
culation will show that at the 90 per cent confidence level a buffer stock 
of 7,000 would be indicated.
If the “buffer” has been set at a level which gives protection against 
the one in ten chance of demand amounting to 3,500 units per week 
during the lead time, then, whenever sales are close to the expected 
(average) figure of 2,500, part of the buffer will still be on hand when 
the stock replenishment is received. This reserve of 2,000 (one in ten 
usage (3,500) times lead time (2) =  7,000 units; normal usage (2,500) 
times lead time (2) — 5,000 units; safety stock =  2,000 units) units is 
called the “safety stock” element of the buffer. The average inventory 
will then be:
30,000
Q/2 +  safety stock = ---------- 2,000 =  17,000
2
In circumstances where the possibility of running out of stock is 
accepted, even at the one in 20 or one in 100 level, the quantity 
formula should theoretically be modified to take into consideration the 
cost of stockouts. This matter is treated in full in most textbooks on in­
ventory control. The bibliography lists some of the texts that cover 
this matter. The formula used in such instances is:
2COR i +  Cs 
QO = --------x ----------
i cs
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In the above formula, Cs is the cost of one unit being out of stock for 
one period of time. The net effect of applying this formula is an in­
crease in the order quantity and an increase in average inventory— 
resulting in an increase of inventory carrying cost. In most cases, how­
ever, the difference is small. A major change in the indicated optimum 
order size will arise only when the inventory carrying cost is very high 
in relation to the cost of stockouts. In a majority of cases, the formula 
on page 13 would be an acceptable approximation.
When both the order quantity and the reorder level (buffer stock) 
have been calculated, a mechanism, must be set up which will indicate 
when the stock of a particular item has fallen to the reorder point. 
This may be accomplished by a physical system such as the two-bin 
method, described in detail in the National Ventifan case later in this 
study. Such a procedure is often used for low-cost items where stock 
records can be eliminated. In a highly mechanized control system 
where stock records are kept on computer tapes or discs files, it is a 
simple matter to program the computer to print out “reorder” signals 
as the predetermined level is reached. In most cases, however, stock 
records are kept in a conventional card file system. In these situations 
the record cards provide the reorder signal. Each card carries a nota­
tion of the reorder level for that item. Whenever a stock clerk enters 
a withdrawal on the card, he compares the new balance with this pre­
determined level and institutes a reorder procedure if the balance is 
equal to or less than the reorder point.
Two important points must be made. The first is that the stock- 
control staff must be convinced of the need for accurate record keep­
ing and scrupulous observance of the reorder procedure. Every issue 
of material from stock must immediately be recorded on the stock 
cards. Periodic spot checks by management, in which a physical count 
of a few items is taken to check the accuracy of the record cards, is 
one way of imposing this discipline; but a better solution is to educate 
stores and stock-keeping personnel to understand the importance of 
accurate records and their role in the overall production-control sys­
tem. Second, order quantities and reorder levels cannot be set once 
and then forgotten. Constant review is required, and whenever a basic 
change in demand levels becomes apparent, (as opposed to a short­
term fluctuation), the quantities must be recalculated and new figures 
must be entered in the record cards. The problems of recognizing 
demand trends, forecasting future demand, and making adjustments
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on a “smooth” basis will be considered in detail in Technical Study 
Number 7.
SOME ADDITIONAL TECHNIQUES
A-B-C Analysis
The determination of inventory policy requires that management 
make a series of trade-offs between conflicting sets of costs—i.e., be­
tween the costs of ordering and the costs of holding inventory, be­
tween the costs of holding safety stocks and the possible cost of run­
ning out of stock. A further trade-off which must be made is that be­
tween the benefits obtainable from an inventory policy and the costs 
of administering the policy in terms of management time. A “near­
optimum” policy, which requires less manpower to both set up and 
maintain, is often more feasible than a fully optimum one.
The complete inventory of materials, parts, spares and maintenance 
supplies for a medium-sized manufacturing company is likely to ac­
count for many thousand separate items. Some of these will consist 
of low value items. Others will be used infrequently so that the inven­
tory turns over very slowly. A method of classification has been devel­
oped using both unit value and stock turnover. This method is known 
as “usage value analysis.” The unit value of each item is multiplied by 
its usage over the past year or, preferably, its average usage over the 
past three years; all inventory items are then grouped into classes 
according to these “usage values.” Almost invariably, a small group 
of items, between 5 and 10 per cent of the total items in inventory, 
will be found to contribute 75 to 80 per cent of the total usage value. 
Controlling these few items will generally account for 75 per cent or 
more of the total dollar value of inventory used. The saving in man­
agerial and clerical labor will also be very large.
Such systems are commonly known as A-B-C classification systems 
because those that employ this method frequently use three classifica­
tion groups. Type A items, the top 5 or 10 per cent by dollar value 
of annual usage, are closely controlled, perhaps to the extent of re­
evaluating their batch sizes and reorder levels every three months. 
The next 25 to 50 per cent of the items, called type B, are subject to 
less strict control: full inventory records are kept for these items but 
quantities and reorder levels are reviewed less frequently. The re­
maining items, type C, are regulated even less closely; perhaps, a 
“two-bin” physical reorder control system might be used and stock
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cards eliminated entirely. For the smaller company, a two-classifica- 
tion system might prove more workable—an A classification indicating 
items which are closely controlled and a B classification embracing all 
other items.
The Fixed Order Cycle System
This procedure is an alternative solution to the problem of when to 
order. The methods so far described involve a batch size which is 
fixed between reviews and a reorder cycle which is flexible, depending 
upon usage rates. The “fixed order cycle system” is the antithesis of 
this, involving reordering at a fixed time but varying the reorder 
quantity to bring inventory up to a predetermined maximum. If, for 
instance, a particular item is reordered on a fixed ten-week cycle to a 
maximum level of 500, the stock cycle for this item, assuming usage 
of between 25 and 50 items per week, and a lead time of two weeks, 
will be approximately as indicated in Exhibit 7, below.
It is apparent from the above diagram that the quantity ordered 
in week 20 will be considerably larger than that ordered in week 
ten because the rate of demand in the intervening period has increased. 
The quantity ordered on each occasion will be an amount equal to the 
normal usage during the two-week lead time plus whatever amount is 
necessary to restore the inventory to its predetermined level of 500 
units. This quantity of 500 units is, of course, management’s estimate
Exhibit 7
R =  reorder Weeks
points
21
of the “normal” usage during the ten-week cycle plus an element of 
safety stock.
The fixed order cycle system is sometimes advocated as a way of 
reducing the cost of constantly reviewing inventory levels. Under the 
fixed order quantity rule, it is argued, inventory levels must be kept 
under constant and close supervision to ensure that new orders are 
placed whenever any item is depleted to reorder level. The fixed 
order cycle system therefore reduces the degree of supervision re­
quired and the possibility of error by substituting a rigid pattern of 
reorder or predetermined dates.
The development of the A-B-C classification system and the two-bin 
method have considerably reduced the amount of close supervision 
required under the fixed order quantity system, however, and the 
fixed cycle system no longer has any significant advantage in this area. 
The one situation in which the fixed order cycle may be preferable is 
where a large number of different items are purchased from a single 
vendor. In that case, considerable economies can be achieved by 
ordering all such items on a single order form. These savings are only 
achieved by scheduling all reorders for items purchased from the same 
vendor to fall on the same day.
The fixed cycle system is, however, particularly dependent upon 
accurate and up-to-date information feedback on usage and the de­
velopment of new trends in usage patterns. If the usage of any one 
item suddenly increases under the fixed order quantity system, that 
item will simply be reordered more frequently because stock will fall 
to the reorder point more rapidly. The only danger of a stockout will 
be during the lead time. Under the fixed cycle system, however, a 
large increase in usage could result in a stockout well before the re­
order time is reached. Buffer stocks under the latter system must 
therefore provide protection throughout the whole cycle, not just dur­
ing the lead time, and the system must be considered more vulnerable. 
It should be recommended with great reservation and only after very 
thorough study of demand patterns.
Electronic Data Processing
Inventory control is an obvious possible application of electronic 
data processing equipment, and most companies which have intro­
duced computers into their operations have adopted some measure of 
automation in their stock control procedures. The degree of sophisti­
cation, however, varies considerably. Three distinct stages may be
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identified: mechanizing procedures previously performed manually, 
performing additional operations which could not be performed man­
ually, and, finally, using the computer as an adjunct to decision­
making.
The first stage is a fairly predictable one. Inventory control systems 
of the kinds already described, using formulas to determine order 
sizes and establishing reorder points for all items, are largely automatic 
in nature and call for relatively little discretion on the part of the 
clerk. Such automatic actions may easily be performed by a com­
puter. The card files, by means of which inventory records have been 
kept, will be replaced by record files maintained on magnetic tape or 
storage discs. Every withdrawal or receipt of stock will generate not 
an entry on the record card but a punched card that is then fed into 
the computer on a daily updating run. The program will include an 
automatic comparison of the new balance with a stored reorder level 
after every transaction, and a reorder list of all items which have fallen 
to the reorder point will be printed-out after updating the run.
This phase should not be taken too literally. One of the major ad­
vantages of installing a computer system is that it forces management 
to review its established practices. Procedures may have to be stream­
lined, redundancies should be eliminated, the information-flow im­
proved, and a greater degree of coordination between different areas 
and functions should be achieved. But the basic decision rules as to 
when to order and how much to order remain unchanged at this time.
It must be stressed, however, that in many cases the stores clerks 
will be doing more than performing a routine function. One of the 
cases in this study, that of Laminated Plastics Company, describes 
a situation in which the stores control staff performed a sophisticated 
reordering procedure designed to reduce ordering costs where a num­
ber of items were purchased from a common supplier. In that case, 
the clerks employed considerable discretion in deciding how to sched­
ule orders for internally produced parts. Most of these functions 
could be transferred to the computer through the use of multiple re­
order points. The important point is that the system study which is an 
indispensable part of the computer feasibility survey must identify all 
the functions being performed.
The second stage may be described as building-in a degree of 
sophistication. At this stage the company begins to do things which 
were simply not practical under a manual system. A good example of 
this is the calculation of order quantities. In a manual system, this 
can be done only at infrequent intervals. Where the A-B-C classifica­
23
tion system is used, the order quantities for class A items will be re­
viewed more frequently, perhaps once a month. The computer’s speed 
in performing routine calculations makes it quite possible to revise the 
order quantity of every item after every transaction if management 
believes such a policy would be desirable. Similarly, programs may 
readily be written to update forecasts of future usage on the basis of 
moving averages or smoothed trends of recent actual demand and the 
results used to revise buffer-stock levels automatically at regular inter­
vals. Any desired degree of “damping” may be built-in to avoid undue 
variations in the parameters and to differentiate between long-term 
trends and short-term fluctuations. Forecasting and trend-sensing 
problems of this nature will be considered in Management Services 
Technical Study Number 7 (to be published).
The final stage is that of simulation. In this phase the computer is 
used not only to operate inventory decision rules but to evaluate them. 
Programs can be written which reproduce as nearly as possible the 
functions of the production-inventory system using existing decision 
rules. Data is then fed into the model to simulate demand for an item. 
For example, actual figures from some past period or a Monte-Carlo 
type random-number generator may be used. The performance of the 
system is then observed, the decision rules are modified where it 
appears appropriate and the procedure is repeated. The use of simula­
tion may avoid many costly mistakes. Simulation of inventory control 
problems is still relatively rare. Interest in the whole subject of simu­
lation is increasing rapidly. There can be little doubt that this tech­
nique will play an increasingly important part in inventory control 
during the next decade.
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The Topworth Toy Company
In October 1967, Richard Topley, founder and chief executive of 
The Topworth Toy Company, met with his CPA, John Lewis, to dis­
cuss his company’s performance during the year ended August 31, 
1967. The recorded profit for the year was disappointing and had 
been something of a shock to Topley. The situation may be summar­
ized by his closing remarks to Mr. Lewis:
“John, this is the best year we have ever had in terms of sales. Our 
sales revenue is an all-time record at $450,000. And yet we only made 
$20,000 in profit. There is something wrong here. I think we run a 
fairly low cost operation—we don’t buy a single piece of equipment 
without a very good reason for doing so, and we have developed 
skills in keeping our old machinery going that practically amounts to 
genius. I pay myself a salary much lower than I could get by working 
for somebody else. I’m sure there should be more of a profit in the 
operation than a miserable $20,000. One of our problems, of course, 
is that this business is so seasonal that for half the year we are lucky 
to have any work on hand at all. Perhaps we should try to find a 
completely different product.
“I know I procrastinated on your recommendations in the past, but 
before we get deeply involved in another year, do you think you can 
perform an investigation for us to determine what’s going wrong?”
Mr. Lewis promised to do some further analysis of the operating
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figures and to try to find the reason for the company’s poor profit 
performance. He suggested another meeting in two weeks.
Background
The Topworth Toy Company was founded in 1955 by Mr. Topley. 
The initial financing had been provided through his personal savings. 
The venture proved successful and in 1961 further funds were pro­
vided by a $250,000 debenture placed privately with a number of local 
investors. Mr. Topley continued to own 100 per cent of the equity 
interest in the company.
Topworth’s products were a range of “soft toys” selling at prices 
between $2 and $3.50 each. These toys were stuffed, washable figures 
of various animals. The outer “skins” of the animals were cut from 
acrylic-pile materials or poly-vinyl chloride sheets. Stuffing materials 
were either latex or plastic foam. The major operations consisted of 
stamping out the basic shapes, seam sewing or heat welding, stuffing, 
finishing and packaging. The direct labor content in this work was 
high, only the stamping-out operation being fully mechanized.
Demand for Topworth Company’s products was highly seasonal, 
with a peak demand occurring in October and November when retail 
stores made their purchases for the Christmas season. The pattern of 
sales during 1966 is indicated in the graph shown as Exhibit 1, page 28. 
Sales were made directly to retail outlets or to the central purchasing 
organizations of retail chains. The company employed two fulltime 
salesmen. Mr. Topley also concerned himself directly in the sales ac­
tivity, and the company’s longer-established customers expected to 
deal with Topley in person rather than with a sales representative.
During most of the year, the Topworth products were produced only 
to order. In the ten-week period, from early August to mid-October, 
however, Topley tried to anticipate which lines would have the heav­
iest demand and to produce some inventory ahead of orders. On the 
whole, however, production levels followed demand very closely and 
had the same seasonal peak. The monthly production figures ranged 
from a low of 7,000 to a high of 30,000. One result of this fluctuation 
was a considerable variation in the size of the direct production work 
force. A regular full-time plant production head count of 15 to 19 men 
was maintained. This was supplemented during the period of peak 
demand by temporary and part-time labor. Therefore, as many as 80 
production workers might be employed during the peak months of
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September and October. The company went to two shifts during that 
peak period and operated one shift during the remainder of the year.
The accounting functions performed by the Topworth staff con­
sisted of little more than invoicing, maintaining customers’ and sup­
pliers’ accounts, and preparing the company’s payroll. No formal cost 
accounting system was employed although it had been recommended 
on several occasions. Topley and the production superintendent priced 
the products on the basis of their experience with the company’s 
operations.
Lewis’ Study
After his meeting with Topley, Lewis spent considerable time think­
ing about his client’s operations. He was convinced that Topley was 
right in attributing his poor profit performance to the seasonal nature 
of the business, but the lack of real cost information made it difficult 
to see where the problem was. He decided that Topworth’s products 
were so similar in nature and had such a small spread in selling price 
that it would be reasonable to think in terms of an “average” unit of 
product and to spread the total labor and materials costs over total
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production on that basis. This calculation produced the following 
figures:
Total production (year ending 
August 31, 1967) in units ............................... 180,000
Total direct labor (year ending
August 31, 1967) ................................. ..........  $153,000
Average direct labor cost per unit ................... $0.85
Total direct materials (year
ending August 31, 1967) ............................. $ 81,000
Lewis was not surprised to find that the direct labor was a rela­
tively large item in the cost of products of this nature. He wondered, 
however, about the real labor cost. He was certain that Topworth 
Company’s production policy was uneconomical and decided that the 
most significant factors would be the cost of training a new labor force 
every year, the cost penalty inherent in the relative inefficiency of 
temporary workers, and the extra costs associated with the second 
shift during the peak production period. It seemed, therefore, that 
the possibility of introducing a new policy which would spread pro­
duction evenly over the year and reduce the high labor turnover was 
worth further study. Such a policy would mean, of course, that stocks 
of finished items would be built up during the periods of low sales 
volume and then run down during the period of pre-Christmas sales 
demand.
The choice would be between the present system with its ineffi­
cient use of labor and a system which would achieve labor efficiency 
at the expense of carrying an inventory of finished goods. The costs 
of holding such an inventory would be the deciding factor. Lewis 
decided that this was the avenue he should propose to the Topworth 
executives and he arranged to talk to Topley and his production 
superintendent, Mr. Castaldi, on the following afternoon.
The Second Meeting
The next day, Lewis met with Topley and Mr. Castaldi in Topley’s 
office. The following is excerpted from their conversation.
Mr. Lewis: I am inclined to believe that a major part of your 
present difficulty arises from your high direct labor 
costs. The trouble is not so much that demand for
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your product is seasonal but that you have a seasonal 
pattern of production. It seems to me that before you 
start talking about looking for a different product you 
should examine the possibility of smoothing out pro­
duction by spreading it over the year and building up 
stocks.
Mr. Topley: Well, that is a possibility, and one that should be con­
sidered, but I am not convinced that that is our answer. 
I hope you can give me some figures. It seems to me 
that we would tie up a lot of cash with that sort of 
policy.
Mr. Lewis: I only have some rough figures. This again points out 
the importance of installing a cost accounting system 
as I have recommended in the past. However, I hope 
to have some better figures after I have cleared a few 
points with you. I’d like to start by talking about the 
temporary labor you hire every year. Can you give me 
any idea how efficient these people are compared with 
your full-time people and how long it takes to get them 
up to their full productivity?
Mr. Castaldi: It’s hard to give you that in figures—we don’t have any 
time standards here, you know. Let me put it this way: 
in the first couple of weeks they are no help, even if 
they have worked for us before. After that they start 
to produce, but I guess they never turn out more than 
75 per cent of the rate we get from the regulars. You 
know, you put your finger on a real problem because 
I’ll tell you—it’s getting worse each year. When we 
started here, we didn’t have much trouble getting peo­
ple for temporary work, but a lot of new industry has 
moved in around here. We just don’t have the same 
labor surplus to draw on. These days we take anybody 
we can get, and it’s mostly women. The other problem 
is that the job is getting more complicated, especially 
with the new plastic materials we are using. You can’t 
teach just anybody to use the new seam-welder in a 
few days. We had a lot of waste this year!
Mr. Lewis: That seems to substantiate my suspicions, Dave. Now, 
let’s see if we can estimate what this is costing you.
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According to your payroll records, the direct labor in 
the past year came to about 61,000 man-hours. Of this, 
32,000 man-hours was attributable to the regular 
workers and the remaining 29,000 was work done by 
temporaries. If we use Dave’s estimate and say that 
these temporaries are about 75 per cent efficient com­
pared with the regular workers after the first couple 
of weeks and call it, say, 50 per cent in the first two 
weeks, we g e t . . . hmm . . .  it looks as if you are paying 
for about 8,000 to 9,000 more man-hours than you 
would if you had all regular labor—and at $2.50 per 
hour, that is about $20,000.
Mr. Castaldi: And that doesn’t include the cost of the materials they 
waste—or the time my foreman spends training them.
Mr. Topley: As much as that? I guess we never have tried to figure 
out what the temporaries were costing us. But what 
about the other side of the picture?
Mr. Lewis: Well, if you build up inventory, you have to store it, 
and that ties up funds. Let’s set a flat rate of production 
at 15,000 units a month. That figure is based on the 
assumption that total sales next year will be about the 
same as this year—180,000 units. I have drawn up a 
graph (Exhibit 2, page 32) which shows what your 
inventory levels would be at various points in a full 
cycle of twelve months, starting with a nominal balance 
of, say, 2,000 units after the Christmas sales, assuming 
that the pattern of demand is pretty much the same 
as last year.
You can see that finished-goods inventory rises to a 
maximum of less than 40,000 units and begins to de­
crease by July. In fact, it reaches a negative balance in 
November and December. This indicates that a moder­
ate amount of overtime would be required at that time 
or else you will have a backlog order situation for a few 
weeks. The average finished-goods inventory, taken 
over the whole year, would be approximately 20,000 
units, and it is on this figure that we need to calculate 
inventory carrying costs. The direct cost per unit—the 
actual out-of-pocket expense to the company—is $1.30,
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and on that basis you will be tying up $26,000 in extra 
working capital. This would probably mean that some 
additional cash would have to be obtained, but, in view 
of this year’s sales figures and the economies that would 
be realized, I don’t think there would be any difficulty 
in getting the bank to provide a term loan to finance 
this, especially since it perhaps could automatically be 
liquidated during the peak sales season.”
Mr. Topley: We may ask you to talk to the bank for us if we decide 
to go ahead with this, but I don’t anticipate any trouble 
there.
Mr. Lewis: Of course—I’d be glad to do that.
Now, there is no question that the use of funds to
finance increased working capital will force you to 
forego other opportunities. Therefore, no opportunity 
costs are involved. So, the cost of these funds will be
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the rate of interest you would have to pay for them; 
perhaps 6 per cent—which would be $1,560 per year.
What other costs should be considered? What danger 
is there that some of the inventory items would be 
obsolete before they were sold? And what about storage 
space—do you have room for a maximum of 40,000 
units in the plant or does it mean that you would have 
to rent storage space?
Mr. Topley: Very little danger of obsolescence—these are good 
standard lines. We add a new one from time to time, 
but rarely drop one. These are not really fashion items. 
But storage space would be a problem. What do you 
think, Dave?
Mr. Castaldi: I don’t think it would be difficult to find room to store 
the products, though we will have to build a lockable 
cage for security. We could take some of the space now 
used to stockpile raw materials before the busy season. 
If we are going to have that amount of inventory, 
though, I’d want to have a full-time storeman and I 
guess we should take his wages into consideration.
Mr. Topley: I agree with that. Well, John, you have given us some­
thing to think about. I need time to think about it 
and check on a few of these figures. You have opened 
up a range of possibilities: We could go halfway 
towards your scheme, for instance, and spread our 
production to some extent without removing the cyclical 
effect altogether. Let’s discuss it again in a few days.
Results
Basing his decision on the estimates in Exhibit 3, page 34, Topley 
decided to institute the policy suggested by his CPA.
Topworth Toy Company’s management decided to tell their CPA 
that they had enough information under the circumstances to proceed 
with implementing an inventory control system. As Mr. Topley put 
it, I see I should have taken your advice more seriously on past
recommendations. What we plan to do now is go ahead on our own; 
however, if we run into any snags, I expect to call upon you to help 
us. It’s not that I don’t want to pay your bills—for I fully expect you
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Economies offered by suggested level-production plan
Savings in direct labor ............................................... $20,000
Reduced scrap and offcuts ....................................... 4,000
$24,000
Additional costs associated with proposed scheme
Interest charge on additional working capital ....... $ 1,600
Cost of storage space..................................................  nil
Storeman’s salary ......................................................  5,000
Provision for pilfering and
spoilage (estimated) ..................................................  800
$ 7,400
Estimated net saving per annum ....................................... $16,600
to charge me for your time on the matter—it’s just that I think we 
should go over some of your past recommendations and see whether 
we can use your services in another area first.”
The proposed change was later put into effect. The “level” produc­
tion volume of 15,000 units per month was maintained by a regular 
direct-labor force of 28 men, which was within the plant’s single-shift 
capacity. Management estimated that some overtime would be re­
quired later in the year, but that the overtime payments would be 
more than covered by the savings of the extra shift bonus payments.
The change-over to the new system raised other problems for the 
company. Production was no longer determined by orders received; 
therefore, the question of how much should be produced and eco­
nomical production run sizes has become important. The batch-size 
problem was met through the use of an “economic lot size formula.” 
Lewis is currently working with Mr. Castaldi to introduce a formula 
into the com pany’s operations. A second problem —that of deciding 
what the total annual production volume should be—is and will remain 
an important factor in the company’s planning. Instead of waiting 
for orders, Topley is constantly anticipating changes in total demand 
and making allowances for any long-term trends which develop, to 
avoid being trapped into changing the production level on the basis 
of short-term fluctuations in demand.
Management’s job has become more complex and demanding in the
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Top worth Company, but Topley is convinced that the financial rewards 
will more than compensate for the extra care required. Lewis was 
engaged to establish a cost accounting system which he was also 
asked to implement. It is probably no exaggeration to say that the 
change in inventory policy has introduced a new phase in this com­
pany’s corporate development.
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The National Ventifan Company
In April 1968, George King, production control manager in The 
National Ventifan Company, was considering a problem that had 
arisen within his area of responsibility. On a number of occasions in 
recent months, important orders had been delayed because parts 
were not available. The most serious incident had taken place a week 
ago. A valuable order for dust extraction fans for a newly constructed 
chocolate candy plant had been delayed beyond the date set for con­
tract completion because a necessary ball-race bearing was out of 
stock. National Ventifan executives believed that an important cus­
tomer had been lost because of this incident and the company presi­
dent, Alan Barber, had made it clear to King that no further shortages 
of this kind were to occur.
Background
National Ventifan was a medium-sized manufacturer of fans, blow­
ers and general air-moving and dust-extraction equipment situated in 
the Great Lakes region. The company was founded in the early 1920’s 
and had, from its earliest years, found its major market in the regional 
food-producing industries, particularly flour mills, chocolate producers, 
bakeries and breweries. Sales growth had been rapid in the early 
1950’s but had become progressively slower in the past decade. Sales 
revenues for the financial year ended December 31, 1967 had been 
$16,500,000, an increase of 2 per cent over the previous year and 5 
per cent lower than the company’s “best-ever” year of 1966.
The company’s products covered a wide range of air-moving capac­
ities and range from fairly small standard lines of ventilating fans for 
warehouse use to large special-purpose dust-extraction “cyclone” units
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built according to a customer’s particular requirements. All models, 
however, consist of the same basic components, electric motors and 
associated electrical items such as: speed controls, fans and impellers 
of varying degrees of complexity, spindles, drive shafts and bearings, 
and sheet-metal castings and ducting.
National Ventifan’s plant facilities included a forge and an exten­
sive pressing and sheet-metal working capacity. Most of the parts, 
however, were purchased from outside vendors. Purchased parts in­
cluded all motors and electrical equipment, bearings and such “stand­
ard” items as screws, nuts, lock washers and bushings. The company 
had a policy of offering servicing facilities and spare parts for all 
models of current or recent production. Recent production was gen­
erally interpreted to mean ten to fifteen years after the point of sale.
While this was the general interpretation, the company did maintain 
spare parts for large volume products even though some of them had 
been out of production for more than fifteen years. Management 
believed that their spare parts and service policy played an important 
part in building customer loyalty and regarded the provision of these 
facilities as a basic company strategy.
In 1967, the company maintained inventories of more than 9,800 
separate items. Of these, 6,500 were used in current production mod­
els, almost half of which were also used in noncurrent models. An­
other 2,000 items were held for use only on non-current models, and 
the remaining 1,300 items were classed as maintenance items or con­
sumable stores.
Perpetual inventory records were maintained in a series of ring 
binders within which record cards could be inserted or removed as 
desired. A separate record card was maintained for every item and, 
at least in theory, they showed the number of items available and on 
order at any given moment. All receipts and issues of the items were 
recorded and a running total maintained. Similarly, orders placed 
were recorded and the running “orders outstanding” was reduced by 
the amount of new stock actually received. In addition to these run­
ning totals of items on order and in stock, the record card carried a 
listing of the su p p lie rs) from whom the item was available and a 
recommended order batch size. This order quantity was established 
when a part was ordered for the first time and was rarely, if ever, 
revised. (A specimen inventory record card is reproduced as Exhibit 
1, page 38.)
The company’s inventory-control staff consisted of the head store­
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keeper, three storekeepers, and a clerical staff of six employees desig­
nated as store clerks. Production or maintenance workers requiring 
items from the storeroom made out requisition slips detailing the item 
(by serial number), the quantity needed and the requesting depart­
ment. The requisition slips were collected by the storekeepers and for­
warded twice daily to the stores office where they were used by the 
clerks to update record cards. Whenever a stores clerk, in recording 
an issue, noticed that the level of remaining stock of that item ap­
peared to be “dangerously” low in relation to recent usage of the item 
(as recorded on the card), he would call this to the attention of the 
head storekeeper. The head storekeeper would then look into the situa­
tion, taking into account outstanding orders for the item which had 
not yet been received from the supplier, and would decide whether 
or not a further order should be placed.
Exhibit 1
STOCK RECORD CARD F. 207
VENDOR (S):
A B C  Mfg.
USED IN:
Current Production  
Spares and Service  
Plant Maintenance  
ORDER QUANTITY: 250
ORDERS PLACED RECEIPTS AND ISSUES
VENDOR and 
ORDER NO. QTY. DATE QTY. DATE BAL. IDENTIFICATION
A B C
1066 250 7 /2 8 /6 5 250 9 /3 /6 5 250 Reed. A B C — 1066
AB C
1215 250 1/12/66 170 9 /12 /65 80 Dept. 3 -2 1 0 7
50 1/10/66 30 Dept. 1 -3 0 5 9
38
THE NATIONAL VENTIFAN COMPANY
King Considers the Problem
Mr. King was well aware that the system currently being used by 
the company was open to serious criticism. He had devoted consider­
able time to inquiring into the causes of recent “out of stock” situa­
tions and had decided that two very important problems existed. In 
some cases a clerk or the head storekeeper had made an error of judg­
ment and the order for replacement items had not been placed in time. 
In other cases, particularly where production of a particular model 
was increasing rapidly, the replacement order had been placed when 
indicated but the amount requisitioned had been too small. There­
fore, the stock was virtually exhausted before the items were delivered. 
Even where a further order had immediately been placed, a stock-out 
had occurred before the second batch had been received. King also 
felt that even where there were no incidents of a stock-out, unneces­
sary clerical work in the stores office was contributing to the total 
inefficiency because many small orders for the same item were placed 
within a short period of time. He realized, in short, that firm decision 
rules were required in order to answer the questions of when to place 
an order and how much should be ordered at any one time.
Attempting to find a solution to these problems, King read a num­
ber of articles on inventory control problems and was aware of the 
existence of a number of formulas and “decision rules” which might 
be of use to him. He wasn’t sure, however, whether or not it would be 
possible to implement such procedures with his present staff, and 
without completely disrupting the stores activity.
Questions
1. What techniques do you think may be useful to Mr. King in 
solving the problem?
2. How can the magnitude of the clerical task be reduced?
3. What difficulties are likely to be encountered in implementing 
your solution and how would you surmount them?
King Receives Some Advice
One day late in April, King lunched with the company’s president, 
Alan Barber, and the conversation turned to the problem of making 
certain that an adequate supply of production parts was available. 
King told Barber that he was considering the introduction of new
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inventory control decision rules, and of his uncertainty about the diffi­
culties likely to arise in implementing the changeover. Barber agreed 
that a real problem existed and made a suggestion. He said that the 
company’s independent auditors, a long-established local CPA firm, 
had an established management services department offering general 
consulting services to their clients. Perhaps they can be called upon to 
lead us out of our stock-out problems, Barber suggested. “It might be 
worth getting in touch with them and seeing what they are able to 
suggest.”
A few days later, Barber and King met with the head of the account­
ing firm’s management services department, Harry Smiley. Mr. Smiley 
had worked with the firm for a few years after qualifying as a CPA 
and had then been given leave to attend a two-year M.B.A. program 
at a graduate school of business. He had been given the job of setting 
up the management services activity on his return from the program 
in mid-1964 and now had two assistants, one of whom accompanied 
him to the meeting.
King opened the meeting by describing the problems the company 
had encountered—and stating his own position. The following dis­
cussion ensued:
Mr. King: I know that there is a rational approach to these prob­
lems. I realize that we are wrong in using reorder quan­
tities established years ago and probably never revised, 
even though our annual usage now might be much 
higher than it was when the quantity was established. 
I am aware that we can use a formula that will tell us 
how large our order quantities should be, on the basis 
of our ordering costs and annual usage, and that we 
should recalculate the quantity every time we have a 
significant change in usage levels. I know that we should 
establish reorder points for each item on the basis of the 
supplier’s lead time. But the size of the job is terrific.
Look, we have over 9,000 different items. T hat means 
working out 9,000 economic order quantities. That’s a 
huge task, even if it is a fairly simple calculation. Then, 
even when we have the quantities established, we have 
to continually review our usage. Seems as if I’ll need 
twice as many store clerks to keep up with all this.
Mr. Smiley: Well, it would be a big job to apply that sort of system
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to every item of inventory, but you may not have to. 
The first thing that should be decided is how many items 
need to be kept under a tight control.
Mr. King: You mean that we should apply the system only to cur­
rent production parts and not to service or maintenance 
parts? I’ve thought of that possibility but it still leaves 
over 6,000 items and that is still a big job.
Mr. Smiley: No, that isn’t what I had in mind. You should start by 
finding out what items really figure significantly in your 
operations. The cost of some items may be very nom­
inal, and even if usage on those items is high, you may 
be able to play safe by keeping a large inventory without 
tying up cash. Other items may be of a high value but 
are not used very often. The critical items are those 
that are both fairly expensive and have heavy usage. 
Now if it is possible to multiply usage by the cost per 
item, a usage value figure for every part can be devel­
oped. Then the usage-value figures can be used to classi­
fy the parts as a basis for inventory control methods.
Mr. King: That seems to make sense. To what extent would it 
simplify our problems? Can these classifications be set 
to determine how many items we should control closely, 
or what?
Mr. Smiley: The classifications you use are entirely up to you. I 
would expect to find, though, that about 10 per cent of 
the parts account for at least 75 per cent of the total 
usage value, and these are the ones you should exercise 
close control over and revise frequently. Those items we 
commonly call class “A” items. Then, if you agree, we 
could divide the remainder into two categories. For the 
“B” items you would use the same decision rules as the 
“A” items but with a less frequent review of usage rates 
and less frequent revision of order quantities. For the 
“C” items you might do away with stock records alto­
gether and use a physical control system.
Mr. Barber: You mean the old two-bin method?
Mr. Smiley: Right. The two-bin method can save you a lot of clerical
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work as long as you don’t apply it to everything. You 
reduce the number of items for which economic order 
quantities have to be calculated, thereby reducing the 
number of items requiring close continuous control. You 
will still have to calculate reorder points for all items on 
the basis of lead time. But the running total records are 
eliminated altogether on some items, which results in a 
considerable saving of clerical routine.
Mr. Barber: Where do we go from here? Can you help us?
Mr. Smiley: Certainly, we can help. I would suggest that my assist­
ant, Bob, spend some time with your stores people ex­
plaining the idea of usage value to them. We’ll want a 
usage value figure for every item. I’d appreciate it if 
you could introduce Bob to them, and make sure they 
realize that he is trying to help them and is not about to 
put them out of a job. Also, you could have your people 
start collecting the other information we need. We’ll 
want an annual usage figure for every part but that is 
readily available from the record cards. We will need 
to know the lead time for each part. We will also have 
to determine how much it costs to hold inventory, in­
cluding both the warehousing and cost of the funds tied 
up in inventory. Bob will keep me informed of progress 
and we’ll get together again when we have the figures 
available.
Al, it would also be a good idea to free up George, or 
his assistant, to work with Bob on this study. You will 
then be able to carry on with the system once it is in 
operation.
I will verify our discussions with an engagement letter 
as soon as I get back to the office. Roughly the job 
should take us about four months requiring about 50 
man-days by our staff. The cost will probably be in the 
neighborhood of $8,500 plus expenses.
Mr. Barber: Harry, if this does the job, it will be well worth the cost.
I have a feeling that our stock-outs have already cost us 
at least three times that in customer relations. Let’s get
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on this matter as soon as possible. I’ll let our boys know 
that I’m backing this project 100 per cent and that I 
have assigned George and his assistant to work with you.
Making the Survey
During the next six weeks Smiley’s assistant, Bob Scott, and Venti­
fan’s stores-control staff completed a usage-value analysis of all items 
in the company’s inventory. As a first step, Mr. Scott took a random 
sample of 1,000 inventory items and performed a usage-value analysis 
on the sampled items. This analysis provided a result that conformed 
fairly close to Mr. Smiley’s prediction in that 10 per cent of the sample 
items accounted for 84 per cent of the total sampled usage value. A 
similar analysis was then performed on the entire inventory.
The calculation of the usage values was not a purely mechanical 
one. Considerable discretion was needed in deciding what figures to 
employ for the “annual usage” factor. In most instances, however, the 
record card indicated that usage during the past year had been abnor­
mally high or low. It was decided that an average figure taken over 
the past three years should be used in those circumstances.
The completed usage-value analysis was tabulated on the basis of 
cumulative percentages of total inventory items and their respective 
cumulative percentages of total usage-value. This tabulation is repro­
duced as Exhibit 2, below.
Exhibit 2
Cumulative Percentage 
of Items
Number 
of Items
Cumulative Percentage 
of Total Usage-Value
10% 986 74%
20 1,972 82
30 2,958 88
40 3,944 94
50 4,930 96
60 5,916 97
70 6,902 98
80 7,888 99
90 8,874 100
100 9,860
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It will be observed that 90 per cent of the total number of items 
accounted for 100 per cent of the total usage-value. This was attribu­
ted to the fact that some items were found to have had zero usage 
during the past three years, and, therefore, contributed nothing to the 
sum of usage values. In other words, virtually ten per cent of the items 
being carried in inventory were no longer used and had not been used 
for three years.
Establishing the cost of placing an order was another matter requir­
ing considerable judgment. The Ventifan Company had never availed 
themselves of clerical time studies and had no predetermined time 
standards available.
Barber concurred that the cost of ordering should include the clerical 
task of originating an order form, and that some provision should also 
be made for the clerical content of the receiving and handling proce­
dures that were involved. After some discussion, management decided 
that an amount of $10 adequately covered the various cost elements 
involved.
After considerable thought, management decided not to include 
any allowance for the cost of the storage space required to store the 
inventory. Mr. Barber argued that the company did not rent any 
storage space: all inventory was held in the in-plant storage facility, 
a building constructed twenty-five years ago. The revised inventory 
procedures were not expected to increase the absolute level of parts 
inventories and he hoped that the elimination of the “no-usage” items 
would in fact reduce the space required. He believed therefore, that 
there was no real “opportunity cost” or out-of-pocket expense involved, 
and that it would not be appropriate to include the cost per square 
foot of space used in the calculation.
On the question of the cost of funds used to finance inventories, it 
was decided to consult Mr. Barth, the controller. Smiley had explained 
to Barth that either the cost of borrowing funds, or an appropriate 
opportunity cost rate (in the form of the company’s normal rate of 
return on funds employed), might be used, and that, while he himself 
favored the latter, there was no definite general agreement as to which 
method was the “correct” method. In Barth’s opinion the significant 
factor in this case was the company’s overall financial position. Man­
agement did not wish to increase their debt structure at the present 
time and was unwilling to approach their banking connections for 
loans in view of the past year’s disappointing sales and profitability 
record. Mr. Barber had given explicit instructions that the inventory 
problem was to be solved without increasing the funds tied up in in­
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ventories. The approach consistent with this policy seemed to be the 
use of an opportunity cost rate, and suggested that the company’s 
current rate of return on investment, 10.5 per cent, be used.
Designing and Implementing the New System
Early in August 1968, Barber and King met with Smiley and Bob 
Scott to decide what should be done on the basis of the information 
now available. They agreed that all items which had shown no usage 
during the past three years should be reviewed and, possibly, elimi­
nated. It was understood that exceptions might have to be made for 
certain items: primarily spare parts for company machine-tools held in 
the maintenance department and the consumable stores storeroom. 
The majority of the more than 900 no-usage items were spares for 
long-obsolete company products. It was proposed that these items 
should no longer be made available from stock. In the unlikely event 
that further orders were received for such items, they would be spe­
cially ordered, since it was not reasonable for customers to expect all 
parts for such equipment to be available from stock.
It was readily agreed that the usage-value classification should be 
used as the basis for the new control system, but there was some dis­
cussion as to whether a two- or a three-category system was most 
appropriate. Barber finally decided that he would prefer to use a two- 
category system initially, and then possibly go to a three-category sys­
tem later. He explained his decision thus:
“Harry, you said that there’s no point in going to a three-category 
A-B-C system unless we are going to make a real difference between 
the way we treat the B and C items. I think that makes sense. I also 
think it might be a grave mistake to change too many things at once. 
The changeover to the order-quantity formula is a big step in itself, 
and it will be a while before we are familiar with it. We have to get 
use to the routine of reviewing the “A” item usage levels frequently, 
and we still have the problem of setting reorder levels for everything. 
I like the idea of doing away with the stock records for low usage- 
value items and using physical controls, but it would be a pretty radical 
step for us. Maybe we’ll be ready to take that step about a year from 
now, but I’d like to wait until we are more familiar with the system.”
The major task remaining was to establish reorder points for all items 
to be retained in inventory. The company’s representatives on the 
project team were made to realize that the basic principle was to
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obtain a reliable estimate of the suppliers’ lead time for each item and 
to set the reorder point at such a level that the stock on hand when 
the order was placed was adequate to satisfy normal usage require­
ments during this lead time. This task was time-consuming but the 
necessary information existed within the company. The stores foreman 
and his staff already had extensive experience with the time taken to 
obtain the most important items; additional verification was obtained 
by consulting the company’s purchasing office or by comparing the 
dates upon which orders were placed and received as recorded on 
the inventory record cards.
The concept of safety stocks was more difficult to put across. King 
did know that it was good practice to build-in some additional stock 
as a safeguard against unusual demand during the lead-time period. 
However, he had no idea of how to determine the size of the buffer 
stock. Again, Mr. Smiley was able to clarify the problem. He stated:
“There is no clear rule on this, George. Buffer stocks are a way of 
buying protection against abnormal stock use. The more protection 
you want, the more you have to pay for it in the form of increased in­
ventory with its associated holding costs. I can’t tell you how much 
protection to buy; only you and your colleagues in the company can 
decide that.
“I would make two suggestions, though. First, you don’t have to 
use the same degree of protection for all items. You might consider 
whether any particular group or class of items is more likely to result 
in holding up important contracts and use a greater degree of pro­
tection for those items than you would for all inventory in general. 
Second, in deciding where to set the level for any item, ask yourself 
'what chance of running out of stock am I willing to accept: One 
chance in ten? in 20? in 100’? Then, if the answer is, say, 'one chance 
in 20’, decide what level of demand during the lead time has one 
chance in 20 of actually happening and set your reserve stock and order 
point on this basis. A statistician would probably call this buying pro­
tection to a 95 per cent confidence level, but I think it is easier to 
understand it in my terms.”
Results
Implementation of the first phase of the reorganization was com­
pleted by the end of August 1967. The policy committee approved the
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elimination of the zero-usage items, and 740 items were removed from 
inventory, leaving a total of 9,120 items.
That Mr. Barber was pleased with the results of the system can be 
determined from the concluding remarks that he made to colleagues 
at the local Chamber of Commerce meeting.
“We have placed our inventory control procedures on a rational 
basis, and I am much happier about the whole procedure. Moreover, 
we have been able to do this without any increase in the overall size 
of the inventories. We will not know the exact effect until we tally 
the inventory prior to our audit in a couple of months from now, but 
right now I would guess that the overall parts inventory has been 
reduced by about $70,000 and there are more savings to come. We 
have found that we were holding stock amounting to eight or nine 
years usage on some of the older items and we are slowly getting them 
down to reasonable levels.
“Best of all, we seem to have licked the stock-out problem. We did 
have a stock-out problem on one item awhile back on a line for which 
we had not yet established the safety stock and order quantity levels. 
Since then we haven’t had a stock-out problem.
“There is still a great deal to do. I’m still not sure that all our safety 
stocks are correct; I guess we’ll have to review them continuously. I 
am thinking of introducing a “C” category some time and using 
physical controls, but not immediately.
“All this has taken up quite a bit of my production control manager’s 
time, but I think it has been worthwhile. We now have our purchased 
parts well under control. The next step is to apply this order-quantity 
formula idea to some of the parts we make in the plant, particularly 
the sheet-metal ducting where it is common to two or more models, 
and see what we can achieve there.
“Fellows, I think it was the best investment we have ever made.”
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Laminated Plastics Company
The management of Laminated Plastics Company was, in late 1966, 
engaged in a study to determine whether or not the company should 
purchase an electronic computer and what economies and advantages 
might be expected if such a step were to be taken. The possible appli­
cations being considered included payroll, sales order processing and 
customer records, and the control of materials and finished-goods in­
ventories. This case, however, is primarily concerned with the inven­
tory control aspects of that study.
The company had, in the earlier stages of its inquiry, considered 
machines produced by a number of computer manufacturers. Each 
had been invited to submit estimates of the equipment required and 
its approximate cost (or rental) on the basis of a general description 
of the nature and volume of the applications being considered. A 
single manufacturer had then been selected, on the basis both of the 
cost of equipment and of the considerable experience of comparable 
applications in other companies in the plastics industry. Laminated 
Plastics Company’s staff and representatives of the manufacturer, 
General Automation, were, in September 1966, working together on 
an in-depth study of the operating efficiencies obtainable. On the 
basis of this study, Laminated Plastics would ultimately decide on 
whether or not to place a firm order for the data processing equipment.
Background
The Laminated Plastics Company was a medium-sized producer of 
a wide range of consumer and household plastic products and of plastic 
components for the electrical and automotive industries. Sales during 
the year ended June 31, 1966 amounted to $25,000,000. The corpora-
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tion employed 1,200 people in three plants in the southern New Eng­
land area.
The operations performed by the company included, typically, 
resin-mixing, impregnating, cutting, finishing and assembly operations. 
The company produced both finished consumer and household items, 
such as electrical fittings, and plastic components for the electrical 
and automotive industries. An example of a component produced for 
incorporation into products of other companies was the range of 
circuit-boards sold to manufacturers of radio equipment, portable tape 
recorders, and so forth. Approximately 60 per cent of the corporation’s 
production was in final-use consumer items, and 40 per cent in “indus­
trial” sales. The industrial production was predominantly in non­
standard components made to customers’ designs, although a number 
of standard lines were offered. In 1966 the product range included 
more than 800 consumer items and 300 different standard industrial 
items. Approximately 500 different custom industrial items had been 
produced to order during the previous twelve months.
Inventory Control in Laminated Plastics
Responsibility for inventory control was vested in the three plant 
“production control” managers. Each production control manager was 
directly responsible to his plant manager and functionally responsible 
to the company production and operations planning manager, Barney 
Fisher. Procedures and decision rules to be used in setting and con­
trolling inventory levels were determined by Mr. Fisher and his staff 
and standardized throughout the company although in practice the 
plant production control managers were allowed to use considerable 
discretion in the implementing of procedures.
A stores-control activity, consisting of a supervisor and ten to twelve 
clerks and storemen, was located in each plant. Each supervisor was 
responsible for both raw-materials inventories and for finished-goods 
inventories where appropriate. Management estimated that the stores- 
control staff spent approximately 35 per cent of their time in con­
trolling raw materials and purchased parts used in the company’s 
products and 65 per cent in controlling finished-goods inventory.
No company product was made in more than one of the three plants, 
and there were, therefore, no items common to two or more of the 
finished-goods stores. All plants did use similar raw materials. The 
raw material, and, to a lesser degree, purchased parts were stocked at 
all three plants. Some interplant transfer of components did take place.
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For example, laminated pressings produced by one plant were some­
times used in a more complex product assembled elsewhere. The 
volume of such transfers, however, was small. The plants were not 
treated as separate profit centers.
Inventory records at each plant were kept on Kardex card files. 
The information maintained on the card for each item included a rec­
ord of monthly total usage (raw material) or sales (finished goods), 
running total balance on hand, and a record of all issues and receipts 
of stock and orders placed. The information used in updating the cards 
was obtained from stores issues, from consignment notes and from re­
ceiving documents. Thus, at least in theory, the Kardex system pro­
vided an accurate and timely record of both the raw materials and 
components and the finished-goods inventories.
The standard inventory control procedures that were developed 
included the use of an economic lot size formula and a modified fixed- 
order-quantity reordering procedure. A definite reorder quantity or 
lot size which had been calculated for every item was recorded on a 
Kardex file card for that item, as was the reorder-point stock level. 
These reorder levels had been calculated on the basis of suppliers’ or 
manufacturers’ lead time and on the recorded consumption or sales of 
the item; a reserve stock element was included as protection against 
abnormally heavy demand during the reorder period. Whenever a 
stock clerk recorded an issue of raw materials or parts to production 
or a consignment of finished goods from stock, he entered the new 
running balance on the card and then compared it with the reorder 
level. If the balance on hand was equal to or lower than this level, a 
reordering procedure was initiated.
The clerks did not in all circumstances observe this set of decision 
rules, however. In many cases, a number of different materials were 
purchased from the same supplier, and transport and handling costs 
could be reduced considerably if some or all of these items were or­
dered at the same time. Similarly, in the case of company-produced 
items, setup costs could have been minimized by scheduling a number 
of related items together. To achieve these savings, a stores clerk who 
found that a particular item had fallen to its reorder point would 
examine the position of related items, i.e., items bought from the same 
source or produced on the same equipment. If any of these items were 
found to be “close” to their reorder points, they would be added to 
the order being placed. No definition of “close” was attempted: the 
clerk used his own judgment.
The company production and operations planning office had also
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developed and instituted a follow-up procedure on orders placed. All 
replenishment orders, whether for purchased parts and materials or 
for company-manufactured parts, were recorded in an order control 
file as well as on the Kardex record cards. One stores clerk in each 
plant was responsible for reviewing all orders shown to be outstanding 
on the order-control file at weekly or, where necessary, daily intervals. 
If warranted, the clerk carried out expediting procedures by telephon­
ing vendors, in the case of purchased parts, and by using the produc­
tion control department expediters in the case of company-made parts. 
The exact timing and degree of emphasis used in the expediting pro­
cedures were left to the discretion of the stores-control staff.
The company production and operations planning manager, Mr. 
Fisher, did not believe that the Laminated Plastics inventory control 
procedures were perfect. Emergencies did occur at times—usually 
because items which were shown on the stock cards as having ade­
quate stock were found to have lower physical stocks. ( Such incidents 
were ascribed to pilfering or to the stores control copy of the stock 
issue slip failing to reach the control office.) A further problem was 
the deterioration of raw materials in the store. Stock handlers were 
instructed to use a “first-in, first-out” procedure but did not always do 
so. On the whole, though, Fisher was well satisfied with the system in 
use, and doubted that any major improvement was possible.
Suggested Computer Applications
Heading the team of general automation staff members working 
with Laminated Plastics in the computer applications study was Miles 
Stevenson, a senior methods analyst. Stevenson was convinced that 
the computer could be used to perform most of the inventory-control 
functions currently undertaken by the stores control clerks. He had 
worked on sales-installation teams with other customers who had de­
cided to use their computers for inventory control among other func­
tions, and he saw nothing in Laminated Plastics’ case which would 
prevent an equally successful installation.
He met with considerable opposition, however, from the plant pro­
duction-control m anagers and stores-control supervisors who argued 
that their tasks were far from routine and mechanical in nature and 
could never be satisfactorily undertaken by a machine. Stevenson 
discussed the problem with Mr. Fisher, and found him willing to give 
any suggestions serious consideration. But, Fisher’s basic attitude was 
one of skepticism, and Stevenson realized that he would be extremely
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difficult to convince. The following exchange summarizes their re­
spective positions at this time:
Mr. Fisher: You’ll have to produce some good arguments to make
me go along with you on this, Miles. I think we have 
a good system working here; we have evolved it over 
a number of years and most of the “bugs” have been 
worked out of it. We have a good team who have 
learned their jobs the hard way and know how to 
handle most of the problems as they come up. We 
give them working rules for guidance, but they use a 
lot of common sense in interpreting them. As I under­
stand it, to put the problem onto your machine you’ll 
have to reduce it to a set of rules to be followed in 
prescribed circumstances. Those rules will have to 
cover every possible situation, because the computer 
can’t use judgment. Well, I don’t think it can be done.
Mr. Stevenson: I have been getting the same argument from your 
plant people, so let me see if I can answer it for you. 
You are right when you say that the machine will only 
work according to the rules we build into the program, 
but those rules can be pretty sophisticated. The ques­
tion is, how much of the “discretionary” activity your 
people perform can be reduced to a set of rules (even 
though the rules may be much more complicated than 
simply “Order when stock on hand falls to 250” or 
something of the sort). On the basis of past experi­
ence, I’d say that most of it can. The other point to 
bear in mind is the information flow we can build into 
the system; we'll be able to give you an analysis of 
usage, outstanding orders or anything else you want 
simply by building in sub-routines to do this after 
the daily updating run.
Mr. Fisher: That sounds impressive but I don’t believe that I need
any more information than I get now. Our records 
are as comprehensive and up to date as we can make 
them, depending only on the accuracy of the docu­
ments we use to update them—and, remember, this 
is a limitation your computer is going to share. I can
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get any sales or consumption analysis I want from the 
cards, and we already have outstanding-order files. 
The cards are a flexible system, too—if we want to put 
additional information on them about a particular part 
or supplier, we can do so. No, I doubt if you could 
produce any useful analysis that I don’t now get and 
you might turn out pages of stuff that I won’t even 
read. Sorry, but I’m still not convinced.
Questions
1. Do you think that Laminated Plastics should transfer its inven­
tory control to the computer? Why?
2. If you feel that further study is required, to what areas would 
you direct the study? Who should undertake it?
3. If you do not believe that the use of a computer is practicable in 
this company, can you suggest any way of improving the existing 
manual system?
Finalizing the System
Study of the potential uses of the computer in Laminated Plastics 
Company continued throughout 1966, and agreement on the specifica­
tions of the system was reached in February 1967.
During this period, Stevenson and his team had many more talks 
with Fisher and the production control staff. The final decision was 
that a mixed manual-automatic system of inventory control would be 
introduced. Fisher had withdrawn slightly from his previous position 
on the use of automatic inventory control; possibly, some pressure had 
been brought to bear on him by the president and other members of 
the senior management team. As the decision to purchase the com­
puter had now been made, management was determined that the 
equipment would be fully utilized. Even more important, the com­
pany controller and his staff were convinced that major improvements 
in certain accounting functions might be achieved if the inventory 
control records could be combined with certain accounting and cost- 
control records to provide a unified order-financing and stock-control 
system. This view was supported by Robert Spencer, a partner in the
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established Connecticut CPA firm which serviced Laminated Plastics 
in an advisory capacity. The controller later described his motives 
for consulting Mr. Spencer as follows:
“By October of 1966, I was beginning to worry about the decision 
we were to make. I suppose every company considering a change of 
this magnitude has a similar problem. We knew our old system pretty 
well. We knew also that it could be improved in many areas, but the 
changes the General Automation people were suggesting seemed 
pretty radical. Well, I wanted a second opinion.
“I am not suggesting that the manufacturer’s team would deliber­
ately mislead us, but they are all computer enthusiasts—they have an 
emotional commitment to their machine. Also, they don’t know our 
operations as well as we do and might discount things that look trivial 
but could become major problems. We have a lot of faith in this 
particular CPA firm: they are familiar with our operation and they 
keep up to date on management techniques. So we decided to call 
them in.”
During the next few weeks, Spencer worked closely with the Gen­
eral Automation and Laminated Plastics teams and occasionally acted 
as mediator between the two, particularly in the area of inventory 
control. He knew that many of Fisher’s reservations were justified and 
that certain inventory control functions would be performed less effi­
ciently if transferred to the computer. But, being in a better position 
than Fisher to look at the overall needs of the company rather than 
those of a single functional area, he recognized the advantages of an 
integrated system of the kind suggested by Mr. Stevenson. As Fisher 
had considerable respect for Spencer’s judgment, the development of 
the mixed-system inventory control proposals was greatly facilitated 
by that CPA’s involvement.
It had been apparent since the beginning of the study that the 
order financing and accounts receivable systems being planned could 
be effectively operated only on a system giving random access to key 
file information, and the specifications of the equipment ordered in­
cluded a disc-type random access storage unit. To obtain the full 
benefit of such a unit, the systems team argued that it would be neces­
sary to maintain the finished-goods inventory on random access disc 
file. The final step after receipt of an order for stock products, for 
instance, would be to use the random-access facility to ensure that
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adequate stock was available. Under the existing manual system, 
this check was made by the order-processing clerk telephoning the 
appropriate stock-control clerk, who answered the query by refer­
ence to the card-file record. By including certain additional in­
formation with the finished-goods inventory records on the random- 
access unit, it would be possible to use the file in the preparation of 
a number of accounting reports. It was decided that selling price 
and standard cost would be included in each item’s file record. By 
multiplying the quantity ordered by the stored selling price for each 
item, the value of an order could thus be automatically calculated and 
used for invoicing purposes. A subroutine could later be developed 
which would accumulate these order dollar values by salesman identi­
fication code to provide a basis for the evaluation and compensation 
of the sales staff. The total sales to date for any item could auto­
matically be multiplied by its standard cost to give a running total 
cost of goods sold. Finally, it was decided that the file record for each 
item in finished goods should include its weight and cubic capacity, 
so that the total weight and volume of every order could automatically 
be calculated as a guide to its delivery routing.
In order to achieve these benefits it would, of course, be necessary 
to centralize the finished-goods stock records, which under the manual 
system were kept in three separate files in the three plants. But the 
control staff argued that they required frequent access to these rec­
ords. The system team responded that the automatic checking of stock 
availability for orders received would eliminate most of the queries 
they were required to answer and that the file updating program 
would print out a daily list of stock items which had fallen to their 
reorder levels. The few remaining instances in which a store clerk 
required an immediate check on the inventory status of any item might 
be met by a visual inspection of the appropriate stores location—i.e., 
a physical check. An agreement was reached that there would be a 
trial period during which the old and new systems would be run in 
parallel. The master finished-goods file would be built up on the 
random access unit in the computer section at company headquarters, 
which was located at the largest plant. The Kardex finished-goods 
files would continue to be maintained in all three plants, however. 
Only when all parties were satisfied that the system was working satis­
factorily and that the programs had been fully tested would the final 
changeover be made and the Kardex files discontinued. As a further 
safeguard against the loss of the finished-goods inventory record by
55
machine malfunction, it was agreed that a “father and son” file proc­
essing technique would be used. This means that a copy of the entire 
file would be made each day before the updating run was started. In 
the event of a malfunction, it would then be possible to read back the 
file as it stood before updating and repeat the run.
One of the provisions of the mixed auto-manual system was that al­
though the finished-goods records would be maintained by the com­
puter the reordering decisions would not be automated. This had been 
arrived at after considerable discussion. Stevenson and his team had 
proposed routines which would perform some of the “discretionary” 
work of the clerks. Where a group of parts was purchased from a single 
vendor, and shipping economies might be achieved by ordering all at 
the same time, it was suggested that the part numbering system be 
modified to give all parts in the group a common suffix. When one 
such part reached its reorder level, the program would call into mem­
ory all other parts in the group. Each parts file record would include a 
“supplementary” or “secondary” reorder level, and orders would be 
placed for those parts which had fallen to these levels. Similarly, it 
was suggested that the follow-up function on outstanding orders might 
be automated by specifying an “emergency action” level (somewhat 
below the reorder level), and using a subroutine to print out a list of 
all parts which had fallen to “emergency” levels after each updating 
run. Fisher and the plant production control managers held that, at 
best, this system would only simulate the work of an inexperienced 
stores control clerk—that it would never be able to exert judgment and 
flexibility of which an experienced man was capable, and that it 
offered no advantages over the manual system. Spencer agreed with 
this view, and it was decided that the computer system should be con­
fined to file updating and the printing out of a list of stocks that had 
reached reorder level with all further action being taken by stores 
clerks in a reorganized central finished-goods stock control office. The 
computer would also be used to print out the list of related items as 
described above, but the decision as to whether or not to order would 
be made by the clerks.
Both the General Automation team and Laminated Plastics believed 
that there would be little advantage in automating the raw-materials 
and production-parts stock records. Pressing reasons existed for re­
taining these records in the plants for use in production-scheduling 
activities. One of the few advantages of a centralized and automated 
system in this area would have been the ready valuation of raw-ma­
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terials inventories; management considered this a trivial matter com­
pared with the arguments against centralization. It was decided, there­
fore, that no change would be made in this area.
Considerable attention was given to the problems of material de­
terioration in storage and it was found that this was essentially a ma­
terials handling problem. The existing store layout made it very diffi­
cult in many cases to obtain access to the earliest dated batches of 
materials without first moving the more recent batches. This problem 
was answered by a revised stores layout giving two-sided access to 
all storage locations and increased storage in cage pallets.
Results and Conclusions
The implementation of the new inventory-control system was started 
in May 1967. By July the transferring of finished-goods records onto 
the computer was completed, though manual records continued to be 
maintained. These manual records were discontinued in January 1968. 
Raw-materials inventory records are still maintained on the manual 
system. Early in 1968 Mr. Fisher expressed his opinion on the per­
formance of the new system in the following terms:
“We now have a fair degree of operating experience with the new 
system and I am reasonably satisfied with it. The system we did finally 
install was a common sense compromise. I hate to think what might 
have happened if we had gone along with some of the ideas the com­
puter boys came up with in the early stages. They sure tried to re­
move the human element in our inventory control decisions. We now 
have the computer doing what it does best: routine updating of rec­
ords and printing out of stock reports.
“I can’t say that we have had any great benefits from the system in 
the pure inventory-control area. We certainly haven’t been able to 
reduce our clerical costs, but we never really expected to. Both the 
General Automation people and Mr. Spencer emphasized that we 
should not expect to justify the computer in terms of labor savings. 
We do produce a number of reports and statistics faster than we ever 
have before, but that benefits the controller’s area much more than it 
does mine. From my point of view I suppose the biggest benefit we 
got out of the whole operation was the shake-up. The pressure—I 
guess you could even say the threat—forced us to look at everything 
we do, why we do it, what rules we use and what the limitations of
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those rules are. This scrutiny produced quite a few side benefits. We 
found out what was going wrong with our FIFO inventory procedure, 
for instance.
“Obviously the results of the changeover have to be judged by the 
benefits to the company as a whole. In the inventory control area the 
gains were relatively small because we were already well organized. 
Ironically, though, we would have gotten more benefit from the 
shake-up if we had been less efficient in the past. The real benefit is 
the extent to which the finished-goods control function has been inte­
grated with other company activities. We’re now a step closer to the 
total integrated management control system that the management 
specialists keep talking about.
“One thing is certain: we don’t have anything like an ultimate sys­
tem. We are already thinking of taking another look at the raw-ma­
terials inventories and seeing if we can’t make some use of all the 
sales analysis information we now produce to anticipate our raw- 
materials replenishment needs—now, that would be a radical change 
from anything we have done in the past.”
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“This information is a complete surprise to us. We have always 
assumed that the pattern of retail sales was pretty close to the demand 
pattern as it reaches us from our distributors. This is the first time 
we have had any real data about retail sales, and it appears to be 
way out of line. I don’t know yet what is going on here, but I am 
surely going to try to find out. I have a feeling that these figures may 
be the key to our production problems.”
The speaker, Ray Miller, was the production control manager of 
Allen Appliances. He had been appointed to this position fifteen 
months previously after some years in the production planning activity 
of a heavy engineering company. Two months after his appointment, 
Miller had asked the marketing manager, David Hillstrom, to cooper­
ate in a survey of the company’s retail outlets. All retailers were asked 
to maintain a record of their dollar volume of sales of Allen products 
during each month of 1966. In January 1967, Miller had just re­
ceived the last of these figures, and was in possession of a complete 
schedule of month-by-month retail sales for a whole year. No such 
survey had previously been undertaken by the company. The pattern 
of sales revealed in these figures was very different from the assump­
tions that Allen management had previously held about the sales of
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their products, and Miller was trying to understand the significance 
of the data now in front of him.
Background
Allen Appliance Company was a small manufacturer of household 
utensils, situated in an industrial area of northern New Jersey. The 
company’s products were predominantly metal fabrications and in­
cluded such items as can openers, aluminum pans, storage containers 
and wire-mesh sieves. Almost two hundred separate items were pro­
duced in the company’s one plant.
Sales during the financial year ended December 31, 1967 were 
slightly more than $2,000,000, which was the highest dollar sales 
volume in the company’s history and represented a 5.5 per cent in­
crease over the previous year. Sales had increased in each of the 
previous four years at rates varying between 3 and 5 per cent per year. 
The pattern of sales was highly seasonal with a single peak in Novem­
ber and December of each year and a marked low in June and July.
Allen products were sold to ten independent distributors situated 
in the eastern and southeastern states. These distributors differed 
little in size, and sold the products of a number of other manufacturers, 
some of which were in direct competition with those of the Allen 
Company. They supplied approximately two hundred retail outlets. 
Most of the retail outlets were independent hardware stores. Each 
distributor maintained a small sales force that called upon the retail 
outlets approximately once every two weeks to solicit orders. These 
orders were filled from the distributors’ inventories and delivered, 
usually by their vehicles, three to eight days after the retailer’s order 
had been received. The distributors themselves ordered replacement 
stock from the Allen Company every four to six weeks.
The company, for many years, maintained a policy of offering de­
livery of all items from stock held in the company warehouse adjacent 
to the plant. In practice this was not always possible, and an order 
backlog usually existed during a seasonal demand peak. Whenever 
the stock of any inventory item in the finished-goods warehouse 
reached a low point, a requisition was sent to the production-control 
office. Not all items requested could be scheduled immediately, how­
ever, and the delay between the production request and the receipt of 
new stock in the plant warehouse varied from five to fifteen days de­
pending upon conflicting requirements for the machinery used to pro­
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duce the item. Delivery from the plant warehouse to a distributor, 
when an item was available from stock, required approximately four 
days.
The Allen Company employed a sales force of two men who visited 
distributors to inform them of new products, and sometimes accom­
panied the distribution salesmen on their calls to retailers. Very little 
was done to promote the product lines. Company calendars were de­
livered to distributors to give to their retail customers, and some point- 
of-sale display materials were produced. No media advertising was 
used, however, and management did not believe that any significant 
degree of brand awareness existed for the products in which the com­
pany specialized.
Miller’s Problem
Prior to Mr. Miller’s appointment, the production-control activity in 
Allen appliances had operated without formal decision rules. All pro­
duction requests were made by senior stores clerks whose judgment of 
when an order should be placed and in what quantities was based 
upon experience and recent distributor demand. The clerks attempted 
to match the level of inventory to the current level of demand. There­
fore, in periods immediately preceding a seasonal peak, the produc­
tion requests exceeded the quantity required to replace units sold 
and subsequently increased the basic inventory. In a slack season 
however, production requests were less than the distributor demand, 
thereby reducing the inventory which had been accumulated. No 
formal procedures for the calculation of order quantities or safety 
stock levels had been developed.
The seasonal nature of demand for Allen’s products, as exercised 
through the medium of distributor demand, resulted in a highly un­
stable level of production and employment. Additional staff was em­
ployed during the “busy” season from August to December and laid off 
during the slack season. Considerable overtime also resulted during 
the months of October and December.
Mr. Miller later related:
“I was unhappy from the first day that I took this job about the way 
the company was handling its inventory and production control, 
largely because they were far too dependent upon the judgment and 
experience of a few key people. I was also unhappy about the way the
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production level and employment fluctuated. Considerable time and 
money was spent trying to train people who would only be employed 
for a few months. This company had the reputation of being a ‘hire 
and fire’ firm which meant that the majority of the people who came 
to work here were the ones who couldn’t get any other job—the bottom 
of the labor barrel. I wanted to establish some rational decision rules 
and to adopt an inventory policy which would let us reduce the sea­
sonal fluctuations in production to some extent and spread our work­
load more evenly over the year.
“I am fairly conversant with the various inventory control tech­
niques. I know how to calculate economic order quantities, how to 
plan a fixed order quantity system and that sort of thing. The problem 
is that one of the critical parameters in calculating batch sizes and 
reorder points is the annual usage. The demand for most of our 
products is so seasonal that it is hard to know what demand or usage 
figure to use. Sure, I could use an ‘average’ figure but the amount of 
variance is so great that I wonder if the figures we calculate would be 
at all meaningful. Further, because the fluctuation is so great any 
attempt to level out production over the year would obviously result 
in massive fluctuations in the finished-goods inventory.
“Well, I had been trying to work out a compromise solution. One 
idea was to recalculate the order quantity and safety stocks at differ­
ent points in the year; say, use one set of parameters in the period 
leading up to our peak demand and a different set during the slack 
period. A further possibility was to smooth out production to some 
extent without trying to level it altogether. There are all kinds of 
possible combinations. I have also been trying to get a better idea of 
just what the pattern of our sales fluctuations looks like—obviously we 
have some kind of a long-term upward trend with a cycle acting 
around that trend.
“That’s about as far as I got when this data came in.”
Results of the Survey
The management of the Allen Company had assumed that the fluc­
tuations in retail sales were similar to those in distributor demand. 
This seemed to be a reasonable assumption, since retail sales were 
the determinant of distributor demand. Again quoting Mr. Miller:
“Let me give you an idea of the extent of the fluctuations in demand 
as we experience it from the distributors. Take a look at these figures.
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These are our total dollar sales, month by month, for the last full 
year (1966).
January ............ .......... $226,000 July ......... $120,000
February .......... .......... 224,000 August ............... ......... 126,000
March .............. .......... 206,176 September ......... ......... 150,000
April .................. .......... 176,000 October ............. .........  2lo,000
May .................. .......... 144,000 November ......... ......... 238,000
June .......... 127,000 December ......... ......... 242,000
Total for year: $2,195,000
Average monthly demand: $183,000
I can best describe the degree of fluctuation in relation to average 
monthly sales. We range from a high of 32 per cent above the monthly
average to a low of 34 per cent. And that is a pretty big fluctuation.
“Now look at these figures. These are the total monthly retail sales 
of Allen products in our two hundred outlets during the same period:
January ....................... $178,000 J u ly ............................... $164,000
February ..................... 176,000 August ................... ..... 170,000
March ......................... 175,000 September ............. ..... 179,000
April ............................. 172,000 October ....................... 193,000
May ............................. 164,000 November ................... 196,000
June 156,000 December ............ ...... 194,000
Total for year: $2,117,000
Average monthly sales: $176,000
“Two things immediately stand out. One is that total sales by re­
tailers over the year were considerably lower than total replacement 
demands on the factory placed by distributors. But this is not really 
surprising: it simply means that we finished the year with quite a lot 
of goods in the pipeline and in distributors’ and retailers’ inventories. 
We know that their orders will now fall off as they use up this surplus 
and draw their inventories down again.
“The second point is the thing that has rocked me back on my 
heels. Contrary to all our assumptions, if these figures are to be be­
lieved, retail sales of our products fluctuate very much less than 
does demand on the factory warehouse. The high point of retail sales 
was only 11 per cent above the monthly average; the worst month was
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only 11 per cent below. We have been assuming that our demand 
from distributors is highly cyclical because retail sales are highly 
cyclical, and suddenly I find that the retail sales of Allen products are 
comparatively stable! I will have to do some thinking about that.”
Questions
1. What is happening in this company? How do you account for 
the phenomena revealed in the survey data?
2. What further information would you like to have? How would 
you go about getting it.
Allen Associates Obtain Outside Advice
Mr. Miller realized that the information revealed by the sample 
was likely to have considerable significance for other areas within the 
company, particularly the sales and production functions. At his re­
quest a meeting of senior management was held under the chairman­
ship of the company president, William Holland, to decide what should 
be done. Miller suggested that this data was of basic importance to 
planning the company’s operations and that management should en­
sure its most effective use. There was general agreement on this point. 
Mr. Holland then voiced the opinion that this was a situation in 
which the company could use outside assistance. Allen Associates 
enjoyed a good relationship with their CPA firm which conducted the 
company’s annual audit. In the past, Allen Associates had engaged 
their CPAs, Hartfiel, Vogel and Faber Co. to assist them on other mat­
ters. Mr. Holland decided that Hartfiel, Vogel and Faber should be 
invited to discuss this problem and to see what help they might be 
able to provide.
Ernest Spell, a partner in the CPA firm’s advisory team, met with 
Messrs. Holland and Miller early in the following week. Mr. Miller 
outlined the situation, showed Spell the data on retail sales, and, 
after some discussion, asked for his comments. Mr. Spell said:
“I appreciate your surprise at the relationship which is shown here, 
but I don’t altogether share it. I have seen a number of studies with 
a similar pattern. Clearly the demand from your distributors which 
you experience at the factory warehouse must depend upon retail sales, 
but the influence of retail sales is being exercised through a sort of
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multiplication factor. I think the answer may be in the way the 
retailers decide how much inventory they want to hold. But you need 
much more information before you can come to any conclusions. In 
particular, I would like to know more about the pattern of retailers’ 
orders to distributors. All this may take time, but you will have a 
much better idea of the dynamics underlying the demand for your 
products. Once that information is attained, a solution would become 
more apparent.”
Holland and Miller accepted Spell’s suggestion and asked him to 
work with them on the problem. Spell instructed one of his assistants 
to devote his time to Allen Appliances, and the collection of the addi­
tional data was started. The company’s ten distributors were asked to 
provide the company with data on the orders they received from 
retailers throughout the year. In most cases, a total figure for orders 
received for the week or month was available but did not show the 
volume for Allen products separately. Most of the distributors were 
willing to allow a representative of the company to have access to 
their records. Subsequently, Spell’s assistant gathered data from four 
of the larger distributors in different areas, and it was decided that 
the figures obtained from them could be taken as a workable approxi­
mation of the general pattern of retail ordering. Spell and his assist­
ant also visited 25 of the company’s 200 retail outlets to talk to the 
retailers about their reordering procedures, and obtained a good idea 
of the methods used. The consultants and Mr. Miller’s staff spent two 
further weeks analyzing the data they had obtained. A meeting with 
Holland, Miller and the other department heads concerned was held 
on the following week.
Spell Outlines His Findings
The results of the fact gathering activities and subsequent analysis 
may be summarized by the following extracts from Spell’s presentation:
“We thought that it would be useful to get an idea of the pattern 
of retailers’ orders, and we were right. The figures we have are an 
approximation, but we think they are representative of what actually 
happens. Now you can really start to see how this cyclical demand 
builds up.
“I would like you to look at this chart. (See Exhibit 1, page 66.)
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Exhibit 1
On it we have plotted the behavior of retail sales, retailers’ orders to 
distributors and distributors’ orders to the factory for the year 1966. 
As the chart shows, we have also plotted the various monthly totals 
and then drawn smooth curves through them, as nearly as we could, 
to show the general pattern. These curves show an interesting rela­
tionship. Each level in the process shows a greater degree of cyclic 
fluctuations than the one preceding it: retailers’ orders vary more than 
retail sales and distributors’ orders to the factory vary more than re­
tailers’ orders. Each level reaches its peaks and vales a little later in 
time than the one preceding it.
“What is happening is this: there is a genuine cyclical pattern in 
the retail sales of Allen products, but not a very great one—certainly 
not as great as you have assumed it to be. This pattern is amplified 
twice, however: once by the retailers themselves, and once by the 
distributors. The result is that the demand you experience at the plant 
warehouse is very cyclical.
“Now, the question is, how does this amplification of the cyclical 
pattern arise? The answer seems to be in the way the retailers and
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distributors decide how much to order. We have spent quite some 
time looking into this. Take a typical retailer. He does not have any 
concept of economic order quantities. He uses a version of the fixed 
order cycle system, not the fixed order quantity system: he reorders 
when the distributor’s representative calls—a fairly constant cycle of 
two weeks. He does have a decision rule, and his order is not simply 
a replacement order. He tries to relate his inventory position—more 
accurately, I suppose we should call it the safety stock element in his 
inventory—to demand, and he does this by making his inventory at 
the beginning of each period some multiple of current demand, as far 
as he can judge it. In practice, that means a multiple of actual demand 
experienced in the previous week
“It isn’t hard to see what happens. Suppose that a particular retailer 
has a policy of keeping inventory equal to eight times current weekly 
demand, and that in the past few weeks demand for Allen products 
in his shops has been around $200 a week. His inventory of Allen 
products will be approximately $1,600. Then, say, in the first week in 
September he sells $210 of your products. Halfway through the fol­
lowing week his distributor’s representative calls to take his order. In 
the past few weeks he has been ordering $400 worth of stock: just 
enough to replace what he has sold in two weeks. This time, he will 
order replacement stock of $410, plus enough additional stock to bring 
his inventory to eight times his new demand level. This level will now 
be $1,680, an increase of $80. Thus an increase of $10 in retail sales 
has resulted a week or so later in the retailer’s order to the distributor 
increasing by $90. There is your amplification! A few months later 
you go through the process in the opposite direction: the retailer’s 
sales fall off and he finds himself with stock on hand equal to about 
twenty times the new demand level. So, he probably orders no new 
stock at all until he is back to his desired position with stock of around 
eight times current demand.
“Much the same sort of thing is apparently happening at the dis­
tributor level, and our inquiries suggest that their reordering rules are 
no more sophisticated than those of the retailers. So the magnitude 
of the change gets amplified again. And this time the amplification is 
even greater because the distributor orders less frequently and because 
the interval between placing an order and receiving stock is usually 
greater for him than for the retailer. He normally already has a num­
ber of orders outstanding with you—in the pipeline, you might say— 
and will probably increase his order even more to fill up that pipeline.
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When demand falls off, you again go through the same process except 
in reverse.”
Deciding Upon a Plan of Action
Following Mr. Spell’s presentation, the group discussed what mea­
sures might be taken. As Mr. Miller later said:
“We knew that the big seasonal cyclic fluctuations were costing us 
money as well as giving us headaches, and we certainly didn’t intend 
to go on living with it if we could do anything about it. Now that we 
know what is causing the cycle, or rather intensifying it, it should be 
possible to do something about it.”
Based on Mr. Spell’s findings, the management group decided that 
there were three basic ways in which they could seek to change the 
situation. These were:
1. Eliminate one of the levels in the ordering process. This would 
automatically eliminate the amplification effect associated with 
that level.
2. Try to modify the pattern of retail demand by means of marketing 
policies.
3. Persuade the retailers and distributors to modify their reorder 
policies.
The first possibility, eliminating one level in the system, could be 
achieved in either of two different ways. The Allen Company could 
decide to eliminate distributors and to supply retail outlets directly 
from the company warehouse. This would have required the creation 
of a much larger company sales force. Management felt that the rela­
tively small volume of sales per retailer would make this uneconomical, 
and that the establishment and training of such a force would be a 
lengthy process. The second possibility was to establish a chain of 
company-owned retail outlets. This latter possibility was considered 
to be completely uneconomical and impossible to finance and was 
also rejected.
The second possible approach to try to smooth out the seasonal 
fluctuations by means of increased promotional efforts, advertising,
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increased distribution discounts, etc., during the off-peak period was 
given serious consideration but was ultimately rejected. The types of 
product made by the Allen Company were not items to which brand 
loyalty was usually attached and it was decided that advertising ex­
penditure would not be rewarding. The possibility of offering in­
creased margins to distributors at certain times was opposed by the 
sales department which considered it to be an undesirable policy to 
adopt, principally because it would be difficult to withdraw the extra 
discounts, when the peak demand period arrived, without causing 
resentment and allegations of bad faith.
The remaining possible line of approach appeared to be the most 
promising. Much of the amplification of the sales cycle arose'because 
of retailer and distributor ordering procedures, and if those procedures 
could be modified it might be possible to minimize the amplification. 
This approach required little in the way of expenditures and was con­
sidered to be very diplomatic. The remaining question was what 
decision rule should they be asked to adopt. Mr. Miller said after­
wards:
“We wanted to find a rational basis for the retailers’ and distributors’ 
inventory policies, and we were certain that we could eliminate the 
surging which had been taking place. We realized, though, that we 
must not try to sell them anything too static. Changes in demand do 
take place, both the seasonal cycle and a long-term upwards trend, 
and they must obviously be free to respond to these changes. The 
problem was to ensure that they did not respond too quickly. The 
established pattern of visits by distributors’ representatives made it 
reasonable to assume that the retailers should continue to use a fixed 
order cycle system. Under this system there is an upper inventory 
level, and enough stock is ordered on each cycle to bring the inventory 
to this level. It was also reasonable to assume that this upper inven­
tory level would be related in some way to sales and would change in 
response to changes in sales.
“We decided that what we required was a way of damping the 
response to these changes: spreading them over a reasonable period of 
time instead of putting them into effect all at once. We therefore 
asked the retailers to use their previous decision rules and to continue 
using their own ideas concerning what multiple of current sales their 
inventories should be. However, we requested that whenever a 
change in inventory level was indicated that the change be spread
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over the next four reorder periods instead of just one. The adjustment 
would thus be spread over two months. What happens then, is this: 
say that a retailer’s sales have recently been steady at $200 a week 
and then increase to $210, and say that he works on an inventory of 
eight times weekly sales. The sales increase indicates an increase in 
total inventory of $80, bu t this is spread over four reorder periods. 
Therefore at the next reorder time, this retailer’s order will be replace­
ment demand of $410 plus $20 of new inventory, a total of $430 (see 
page 67). Under the old system it would have been $490, as you can 
see from this chart (Exhibit 2, page 71).
“The system we have introduced at the distribution level is very 
similar. I suppose you could argue that there is less reason to use a 
fixed order cycle system in this case and that we could have explored 
the use of a fixed order quantity system with them, but we didn’t do 
that. The fixed order cycle approach works well because we supply 
them with a whole range of different items, and if we receive orders 
for all the items at the same time we can average deliveries at the 
lowest possible cost. An even more important consideration, though, 
was that we believed that our best chance of getting the cooperation 
of the distributor was to change things as little as possible. The 
‘damping’ idea we introduced wasn’t too great a departure from what 
they were already doing and we didn’t have too much trouble getting 
them to go along with us.
“The changes we have made seem successful. We do not yet have 
the full 1967 figures available to us, but we do know that sales fell off 
much more slowly during June and July than they have in previous 
years. The lowest monthly sales figure came in August this year, not 
July, and was $136,000, compared with our 1966 low of $120,000. And 
the indications seem to be that the damping is working equally well in 
the current peak sales period. I can now start concentrating upon 
the implications of all this for our own plant inventory and production 
policies, and I intend to make use of Mr. Spell’s services again in this 
area.”
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Exhibit 2
Retailer's Response to Sales Increase from $200 to $210 
Per Week Occurring in Week 5
New System
Using "Damping"
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